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SURVEILLANCE BY ALGORITHM: THE NSA, COMPUTERIZED
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Peter Margulies*
Abstract
ISIS’s cultivation of social media has reinforced states’ interest in
using automated surveillance. However, automated surveillance using
artificial intelligence (“machine learning”) techniques has also sharpened
privacy concerns that have been acute since Edward Snowden’s
disclosures. This Article examines machine-based surveillance by the
NSA and other intelligence agencies through the prism of international
human rights.
Two camps have clashed on the human rights implications of machine
surveillance abroad. The state-centric camp argues that human rights
agreements like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) do not apply extraterritorially. Moreover, the state-centric camp
insists, machine surveillance is inherently unintrusive, like a dog seeing
a human step out of the shower. Surveillance critics respond that machine
and human access to data are equivalent invasions of privacy and legal
protections must be equal for individuals within a state’s borders and nonnationals overseas. In a controversial recent decision, Schrems v. Data
Protection Commissioner, the European Court of Justice appeared to side
with surveillance’s critics.
This Article argues that both the state-centric and critical positions are
flawed. This Article agrees with surveillance critics that the ICCPR
applies extraterritorially. Machine access to data can cause both
ontological harm, stemming from individuals’ loss of spontaneity, and
consequential harm, stemming from errors that machines compound in
databases such as no-fly lists. However, the Schrems decision went too
far by failing to acknowledge that human rights law provides states with
a measure of deference in confronting threats such as ISIS. Deference on
overseas surveillance is particularly appropriate given U.N. Security
Council resolutions urging states to deny terrorists safe havens. But
deference cannot be absolute. To provide appropriate safeguards, this
Article recommends that machine searches abroad be tailored to
compelling state purposes, scientifically validated, and subject to
independent review.

* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Colgate University,
1978; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1981. I thank Sudha Setty and participants at a workshop at
Western New England University School of Law for comments on a previous draft.
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INTRODUCTION
Searching for a needle in a haystack is a metaphor for human futility,
but searching for a fact in a haystack of data is just more code for a
computer.1 Nevertheless, appreciation for the computer’s prowess has not
translated into applause for automated surveillance. Concerned
commentators invoke Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, in which minders
perpetually keep tabs on inmates.2 Others assert that automated
surveillance designed to detect overseas terrorists such as Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) recruits3 is ineffective, echoing humans’ ill-fated
1. See IAN H. WITTEN ET AL., DATA MINING 21–22 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing private sector
data mining of Internet usage patterns).
2. See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT
YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 32 (2015); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK
92–93 (2007).
3. ISIS, also known as ISIL or the Islamic State, is fighting the Assad regime and Westernbacked forces in Syria, gaining control of territory in Iraq, and inspiring recruits to violence
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haystack dives.4 Suppose, however, that technological progress makes
computer (machine) searches effective tools in locating overseas
terrorists.5 That promise should prompt inquiry into machine searches’
status under human rights law.6
In the international realm, Article 17 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits arbitrary intrusions on
privacy.7 This Article argues that states should receive a measure of
deference in using scientifically validated machine searches to collect
overseas intelligence, subject to both substantive and procedural
constraints. Privacy objections to machine searches are not wholly
misplaced. However, such objections should be tempered by awareness
of the positive role safeguards can play and the advantages that properly
cabined automated surveillance provides.
This safeguard-centered approach to machine access contrasts with
both a state-centric approach and the position of critics of state
surveillance. A state-centric approach might view international machine
access as entirely appropriate, even without meaningful safeguards. In
keeping with this view, the U.S. position is that the ICCPR does not bind
states parties extraterritorially.8 A state-centric view regards machine
worldwide. See Anne Barnard & Michael R. Gordon, Goals Diverge and Perils Remain as U.S.
and Turkey Take on ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/world
/middleeast/us-and-turkey-agree-to-create-isis-free-zone-in-syria.html.
4. See William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks,
88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1661 (2010).
5. The term “machine search” refers to a search conducted by a computer or computer
network at human initiative or under human direction. When using a machine search, human
analysts may not review all the data accessed by the machine but may only view a far smaller set
of data outputs. Professor William Banks acknowledges that machine searches of massive troves
of data, sometimes called “data mining,” may be effective as a “preliminary screening method”
in identifying terrorists. See id.; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PROTECTING
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISTS 4, 77 (2008) (discussing risks and
possible benefits of counterterrorism data mining). Given the difficulty in identifying violent
extremists and the risks posed by false negatives (here, terrorists erroneously classified as
innocents), even a “preliminary” detection method has promise.
6. While this Article touches on the domestic use of machine searches, it leaves extended
discussion of Fourth Amendment issues to others. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 21–47
(providing a comprehensive approach to new technology); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data
and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 388–92 (2015) (cataloguing risks
and benefits of new technology and its effect on the Fourth Amendment). In searches abroad,
targeting persons with no ties to the United States, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. See
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265, 274–75 (1990).
7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
177 [hereinafter ICCPR].
8. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, ANNEX I (2005) [hereinafter STATE DEP’T PERIODIC
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access as inherently free of the intrusiveness of human access.9
In contrast, critics of state surveillance in general and U.S.
surveillance in particular posit what this Article refers to as the
equivalency thesis. The thesis contains three interrelated propositions.
First, surveillance critics claim that machine and human access are
equivalent invasions of privacy.10 Second, critics assert that the United
States’ technological capabilities—not the law—drive government
surveillance practices.11 Third, critics claim that human rights law
requires equivalent protections for both U.S. and non-U.S. persons.12
This Article argues that both the state-centric and equivalency thesis
are wrong. Taking issue with the state-centric approach, this Article
REPORTS]; see also Ashley Deeks, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J.
INT’L L. 291, 307 (2015) (observing that the “United States has long interpreted the ICCPR not to
apply extraterritorially”); Peter Margulies, The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human
Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2143 (2014).
9. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245,
254 (2008) (arguing that machine searches do not intrude on privacy because computers are not
“sentient beings”). For a more nuanced critique of privacy advocates’ assumptions, see William
H. Simon, Rethinking Privacy, BOS. REV. (Oct. 20, 2014), http://bostonreview.net/booksideas/william-simon-rethinking-privacy-surveillance (asserting that privacy advocates derive
their views from an illusory baseline in which individuals form their identities uninfluenced by
the views of others).
10. See SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 130 (arguing that surveillance conducted via computer
algorithms is materially identical to human surveillance in terms of intrusiveness).
11. In other words, the U.S. and other states will generally do whatever they are
technologically capable of doing. See Ryan Devereaux et al., Data Pirates of the Caribbean: The
NSA Is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas, INTERCEPT (May 19, 2014, 12:37 PM),
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cellphone-call-bahamas/ (quoting Michael German, former American Civil Liberties Union counsel
and former FBI agent, as observing that intelligence officials “have this mentality—if we can, we
will”); cf. Axel Arnbak & Sharon Goldberg, Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitution:
Unrestrained Bulk Surveillance on Americans by Collecting Network Traffic Abroad, 21 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 317, 319–22 (2015) (arguing that surveillance conducted by National
Security Agency (NSA) is driven by technological capabilities and unconstrained by provisions
of relevant law).
12. E.g., David Cole, We Are All Foreigners: NSA Spying and the Rights of Others, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 29, 2013, 12:48 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/2668/foreigners-nsa-spyingrights/ (critiquing U.S. surveillance policy overseas as inconsistent with human rights); see also
Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism), Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 43, U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sept.
23, 2014) (asserting that states are “legally bound to afford the same protection to nationals and
non-nationals, and to those within and outside their jurisdiction”); Jennifer Granick, Foreigners
and the Review Group Report: Part 2, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 19, 2013, 12:47 PM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/4838/foreigners-review-group-report-part-2/ (welcoming a Review
Group’s recommendation to limit U.S. surveillance of non-U.S. persons). A U.S. person within
the meaning of this Article refers to a U.S. citizen or lawful resident, or an individual of any
nationality or immigration status who is physically present in the United States.
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demonstrates that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially. Moreover,
unfettered machine access abroad would violate the ICCPR’s prohibition
on arbitrary intrusions on privacy. At the same time, this Article argues
that the equivalency thesis’s propositions each miss the mark. Consider
the proposition that human and machine access are equally intrusive.
Although unfettered machine access is problematic, computers’ lack of
consciousness suggests that cabined machine access is consistent with
human rights law.13 Safeguards that limit human access can ensure that
some level of machine access passes muster.
This Article also identifies flaws in the equivalency thesis’s second
assertion, which this Article calls the technological imperative:
government practice will inevitably extend to the limits of government
capabilities.14 While advances in technology can exert a powerful
gravitational pull on operations, the technological imperative fails to
reckon with the robust safeguards, such as search filters, that technology
can impose on both human and machine searches. In addition,
surveillance critics who embrace the technological imperative as a
descriptive matter ignore legal safeguards that limit state surveillance.
Dismissing current safeguards may impose too high a bar for reform,
since any protections that are likely to be adopted may also earn critics’
disdain. Critics eager to proclaim the virtues of freedom and progress15
do not always grasp Voltaire’s observation that the perfect is the enemy
of the good.16
The equivalency theorists’ second assertion also fails to address a
paradox that emerges from the interaction of accuracy and transparency
in machine data analysis. A nuanced account would distinguish between
directed techniques using keywords submitted by human analysts and
autonomous techniques in which analysts input data and machines then
13. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 195 (explaining that machine searches
accompanied by restrictions on analysts’ queries of the resulting database could preserve
anonymity and therefore reduce intrusions on privacy).
14. Surveillance critics use this assertion for descriptive purposes; as a normative matter,
they argue vigorously that the government should not collect everything it can collect. See, e.g.,
SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 92–98 (addressing privacy rights and abuse of government
surveillances).
15. See, e.g., id. at 97–98.
16. However, privacy advocates are right to assert that the temptations posed by the
technological imperative require further privacy safeguards, including independent review of
intelligence collection and a public advocate at the United States’ Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (the FISC) who will provide a voice opposing the government’s surveillance
requests. See Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The Constitutionality of a FISA “Special
Advocate,” JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/2873/fisaspecial-advocate-constitution/ (discussing the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board’s
“special advocate” proposal).
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find patterns independent of explicit human commands.17 Autonomous
techniques give rise to what this Article refers to as the transparency
paradox: these searches use “hidden layers” of computing power to group
myriad variables more accurately.18 However, because the layers assess
so many variables, analysts cannot provide a substantive verbal
explanation for courts or other legal gatekeepers seeking an articulable
justification for individual searches. As a result, the law could preclude
more accurate techniques, while embracing techniques that produced
more errors but provided the familiar comforts of a verbal explanation.
Surveillance critics avoid this issue by dismissing the accuracy of
autonomous searches in the counterterrorism context.19 If they are wrong
about accuracy, however, the transparency paradox becomes too
important to ignore.
The equivalency theorists’ third proposition—a state must accord the
same rights to its nationals and persons overseas—also ignores both
practicality and precedent. The ICCPR, as the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) acknowledged in Weber v. Germany,20 gives states
greater leeway in surveillance of transnational communications than in
surveillance of domestic communications.21 Transnational surveillance
with safeguards can assist in vindicating international norms, such as the
framework of cooperation against ISIS and other terrorist groups
established in United Nations Security Council resolutions 217822 and
1373.23 Measured overseas surveillance can compensate for the ability of
extremist non-state actors to find safe havens in weak states. In addition,
while transnational surveillance can diminish privacy, it can also enhance
privacy by combating rogue cyber states and non-state actors who breach
17. Cf. STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 694–95 (3d ed.
2010) (describing the three types of feedback that determine learning: unsupervised learning,
reinforcement learning, and supervised learning).
18. See WITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 467, 469.
19. E.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 136–39.
20. 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.
21. See id. at paras. 87–88; Sarah St. Vincent, International Law and Secret Surveillance:
Binding Restrictions upon State Monitoring of Telephone and Internet Activity, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 4, 2014), https://cdt.org/files/2014/09/CDT-IL-surveillance.pdf. The
ECHR’s deferential approach suggests that European and U.S. legal analysis of the intersection
of privacy and national security may not be all that different, despite differences in rhetoric; cf.
Francesca Bignami, European Versus American Liberty: A Comparative Privacy Analysis of
Antiterrorism Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 632–33 (2007) (noting parallels in European
and U.S. conceptions); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004) (arguing that the United States protects privacy to
safeguard liberty, while Europeans view privacy as central to dignity, which they define as sparing
the individual from unwelcome public attention).
22. S.C. Res. 2178, paras. 2–4 (Sept. 24, 2014).
23. S.C. Res. 1373, paras. 1–3 (Sept. 28, 2001).
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privacy protections.24 Moreover, overseas surveillance can be appropriate
under the law of armed conflict (LOAC) as a form of reconnaissance.25
In light of these concerns, this Article defends a measure of deference
for states’ overseas machine surveillance. Just as the ECHR has accorded
states a “margin of appreciation” in taking steps that protect security and
public safety,26 the proportionality inquiry underwritten by the ICCPR
Article 17 arbitrariness standard should be deferential. However, a
measure of deference does not entail a blank check.
This Article proposes three elements of accountability for machine
surveillance: First, surveillance must be for a compelling purpose, such
as national security,27 and should be tailored to that goal. For example,
bulk collection of the content of another state’s communications should
be prohibited, unless the state whose data is collected is involved in an
armed conflict with the collecting state. Under this test, the United States
could continue to engage in bulk collection in Afghanistan for the
duration of the armed conflict there but could not engage in bulk
surveillance of content in the Bahamas, where the United States
reportedly conducts bulk surveillance of all communications to reach the
far smaller set of narcotics and human traffickers.28 Second, searches
should be reliable and subject to accepted techniques for validation. To
deal with the transparency paradox that affects autonomous searches, this
Article argues that human rights law should accept a methodological
24. See David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 229 & n.38
(2016).
25. Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and International
Humanitarian Law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 595, 595–98 (2012)
(analyzing surveillance and reconnaissance in the context of using drones for targeted killing
during an armed conflict).
26. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), paras. 47, 66 (1976)
(regulating public dissemination of information about human sexuality to protect children). The
ECHR’s use of the margin of appreciation in cases involving free expression provides an a fortiori
case for the margin’s materiality in adjudicating surveillance.
27. These include the limits that President Barack Obama outlined in Presidential Policy
Directive No. 28 (PPD-28), which restricted bulk collection of content abroad to specific
purposes, such as countering terrorism, espionage, arms proliferation, cybercrime or other
international lawbreaking, or evasion of lawful sanctions. See Press Release, Office of the Press
Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive – Signals Intelligence Activities (Jan. 12, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-inte
lligence-activities [hereinafter PPD-28]. The U.S. government distinguishes between bulk and
targeted collection. Id. Bulk collection obtains virtually all communications content or other data
for subsequent analysis, while targeted collection obtains only data that corresponds to certain
specific identifiers. See PPD-28 Section 4 Procedures, USSID SP0018: Supplemental Procedures
for the Collection, Processing, Retention, and Dissemination of Signals Intelligence Information
and Data Containing Personal Information of Non-United States Persons, at 7 n.1–2 (Jan. 12,
2015) [hereinafter PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures].
28. See Devereaux et al., supra note 11.
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explanation of a machine search’s validity in place of a substantive verbal
explanation.
Third, review must be independent. Decisions by the ECHR29 and the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), including the 2015
decision in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner30 and the 2014
decision in Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Ireland,31 require some level of
independent review of surveillance.32 The United States provides judicial
review of much of its surveillance through the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC).33 To complement the FISC, it should also
create an executive branch agency to review surveillance under Executive
Order 12,333, a Reagan Administration measure that authorizes the
collection of intelligence.34 The new agency should be shielded from
political influence to the maximum degree possible under the U.S.
Constitution. The agency should address complaints by individuals that
their personal data has been wrongfully collected, retained, or
disseminated. Moreover, the FISC should have input from a robust voice
that opposes government surveillance requests. The provision for amici
curiae in the newly enacted USA Freedom Act35 improves the situation.
So does the provision for a State Department ombudsperson in Privacy
Shield, the EU–U.S. data transfer agreement that replaces the agreement
invalidated by the CJEU in Schrems.36 However, more improvement is
needed.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I explains the way in which
machine searches operate and the sources of U.S. legal authority for their
use. Part II considers both deontological and consequentialist arguments
on whether machine access is less intrusive than human access. It
concludes that while machine access is less intrusive on both
deontological and consequential grounds, safeguards are necessary for
deploying it. Part III considers surveillance critics’ claim that a state’s
surveillance capabilities dictate its surveillance practices. This Part, while
29. See, e.g., Zakharov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 147 (2015); Kennedy v. United
Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 79–80 (2010).
30. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R.
31. Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Comm’r, 2014 E.C.R.
32. See Banks, supra note 4, at 1661; Deeks, supra note 8, at 358.
33. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/
history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_fisc.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2016).
34. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941–42 (Dec. 4, 1981).
35. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i) (2012); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The FISA Court and Article
III, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1161, 1179 (2015) (suggesting that “special advocate” in FISC
proceedings who would oppose government requests in a wider range of cases would ameliorate
concerns that the provisions for FISC review of surveillance procedures under § 702 violate
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which governs the role of federal courts).
36. See European Comm’n, Commission Implementing Decision Pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection
Provided by the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield 26 (Feb. 2016) [hereinafter EC Adequacy Decision].
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acknowledging that the technological imperative to expand capability
influences surveillance practice, notes that privacy advocates unduly
discount both technology’s potential to protect against intrusive searches
and the power of legal safeguards to curb abuses.
Part IV considers the state-centric view that human rights agreements
like the ICCPR do not apply extraterritorially and shows that the ICCPR’s
language and purpose support extraterritorial application. Part V suggests
a normative framework for machine surveillance overseas, in light of the
ICCPR’s prohibition on arbitrary intrusions. This framework is
deferential because of the need to accommodate conflicting international
norms, including Security Council resolutions against terrorism and
LOAC, as well as the privacy benefits of surveillance targeting
international cyber criminals. However, the framework’s deference is not
absolute. To ensure accountability, the model requires that states tailor
surveillance to a compelling purpose, demonstrate the reliability of their
machine surveillance through commonly accepted scientific methods,
and provide for independent review and recourse. These safeguards will
allow governments to utilize machine searches to protect the public while
also protecting privacy.
I. INSIDE THE MACHINE: COMPUTERS AND SURVEILLANCE
Because “Big Data” is too big for humans to process, machine
searches are increasingly important in both government and the private
sector.37 Such searches can entail different methods of gaining access to
data, which in the United States typically have different sources of legal
authority. This Part distinguishes between scanning and collection; it then
divides the latter into bulk and targeted collection.
Different types of machine searches can also entail more or less
human involvement. This Part describes directed machine searches,
which require supervision from a human analyst. It then describes
autonomous searches, where humans feed data to a machine, permit the
machine to find patterns on its own, and then validate the results. Each
method has trade-offs. This Article defines one of these crucial trade-offs
as the transparency paradox: in autonomous searches, accuracy often
improves at the expense of transparency. Machines that are fed enough
data can discern patterns that humans would miss. However, because of
the volume of data involved in such searches and the number of variables
that the machine analyzes, humans cannot offer a substantive, verbal
37. See Jorge Garcia, Machine Learning and Cognitive Systems: The Next Evolution of
Enterprise Intelligence (Part I), WIRED, http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/07/machinelearning-cognitive-systems-next-evolution-enterprise-intelligence-part/ (last visited Mar. 18,
2016).
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explanation of the machine’s reasoning path. This raises a legal issue that
this Article addresses in subsequent Parts: ranking transparency and
accuracy, when enhancing one value will sacrifice the other.38
A. Scanning Versus Collection
If one analogizes machine access to living arrangements, scanning is
like a quick visit, while collection resembles a lengthy stay. Scanning
intrudes on privacy in passing, while collection contemplates the storage
of data by the collecting entity. The differences between scanning and
collection matter less in the private sector, where scanning of internet
users’ data is ubiquitous and recurring. Those differences have higher
stakes for the government’s machine access.
1. Scanning in Government and the Private Sector
Scanning involves the recurring inspection, usually by machine, of
information from individuals, but it does not entail the storage of all the
information by the scanning party. A private firm or government agency,
respectively, can scan a user’s email, as Google does with Gmail, or gain
access to interchange points in the transmission of internet
communications, as the U.S. government does pursuant to statute.39 For
example, in scanning pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act,40 the NSA’s machines gain
access through a buffer, cache, or other device that temporarily stores
transnational communications in the course of transmitting them to their
destination. Scanning is by definition a process that allows machines to
gain access to a huge volume of communications, the vast majority of
which are substantively irrelevant. In the process of scanning, the
machine selects material that is relevant and designates that material for
collection and subsequent analysis.
In the commercial internet space, scanning is not a part of the business
model; it is the business model.41 Google’s computers use algorithms
devised by Google’s own engineers or searches crafted by the firm’s
computers to scan users’ web-browsing histories and the contents of
38. See infra Section I.C.
39. In re Government’s Ex Parte Submission of Reauthorization Certification for 702
Program, 2011 WL 10945618, at *5, *19–20, *23 (Foreign Intell. Surveillance Ct. Oct. 3, 2011)
(describing government’s use of designated “facilities” and “selectors” with links to terrorism or
other foreign intelligence information, including not only communications to or from phone
numbers or e-mail addresses, but also communications “about” these identifiers).
40. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
41. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 49 (noting that “[s]urveillance is the business model of the
Internet”); see also Ferguson, supra note 6, at 358–59 (discussing the commercial rationale for
corporate data mining).
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individuals’ emails.42 Private firms engage in such scanning for two key
reasons. First, firms refine their knowledge of users’ aggregate browsing
practices, which Google then uses to make its searches and search
rankings more precise.43 Second, Google and other firms gather
information about particular users, which firms use to tailor web-based
advertising to that user’s habits and interests.44
The U.S. government uses scanning internationally but not
domestically. Both the Constitution and various statutes preclude the
government from scanning the content of purely domestic
communications—communications between two individuals located
within the United States.45 However, under FISA, the U.S. government
scans devices such as buffers and caches used in international
communications—communications between a person in the United
States and a person that government officials reasonably believe to be
located overseas.46 Under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of
42. See Samuel Gibbs, Gmail Does Scan All Emails, New Google Terms Clarify, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 15, 2014, 8:24 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/apr/15/gmail-scans-allemails-new-google-terms-clarif; Steven Levy, Exclusive: How Google’s Algorithm Rules the
Web, WIRED (Feb. 22, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2010/02/ff_google_algorithm/.
Private sector scanning is premised on either express or implicit consent by internet users. See In
re Yahoo Mail Litig., 308 F.R.D. 577, 584–85 (N.D. Cal. 2015); cf. BENJAMIN WITTES &
GABRIELA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE 135 (2015) (arguing that users’ web data “tends to be
material we have disclosed to others, often in exchange for some benefit and often with the
understanding . . . that it will be aggregated and mined for what it might say about us”).
43. See Levy, supra note 42.
44. See Gibbs, supra note 42.
45. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490, 2494–95 (2014) (in holding that a digital
search of a suspect’s cell phone is not a search incident to arrest and therefore requires a warrant,
the Court described the cell phone as a “cache of sensitive personal information”); cf. Orin S.
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 291–92 (2015)
(discussing case law on the effect of borders on Fourth Amendment rights). But see Jennifer
Daskal, The Un-territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 364–66 (2015) (arguing that national
borders are an artificial and outmoded basis for determining Fourth Amendment limits on data
searches). Government scanning of domestic communications content for data mining on
terrorism would be problematic on legal, ethical, and policy grounds. Cf. James X. Dempsey &
Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1466–67
(2004) (warning of the adverse privacy consequences of government data mining of domestic
records for pattern-based searches).
46. PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, at 7 n.2 (permitting temporary
acquisition of data “to facilitate targeted collection, such as search and development
activities . . . or the processing of a signal that is necessary to select specific communications for
forwarding for intelligence analysis”). Some have argued that intelligence agency access to
international data outside the purview of bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) is
problematic. This Article focuses on human rights issues, and the role of MLATs is beyond its
scope. It is worth noting that the ECHR has held that transnational surveillance of another
country’s nationals does not violate the sovereignty of that country because no physical intrusion
occurs. See Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 81; Joris V.J. van Hoboken & Ira S.
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2008, which Congress enacted with votes from liberal legislators,
including then-Senator Barack Obama, the United States can gain access
to such communications.47 However, Section 702 and policies
implementing the statute impose limits on the government’s collection of
such data.48 Describing those limits requires unpacking the distinction
between targeted and bulk collection.
2. Targeted and Bulk Collection
Targeted collection entails the use of particularized identifiers or
selectors to winnow out irrelevant scanned data. Under Section 702, U.S.
intelligence agencies can store the content of calls between persons in the
United States and those reasonably believed to be located outside the
country only if scans have revealed that such communications include
specific selectors, such as phone numbers, email addresses, and discrete
topics related to national security or foreign affairs.49 The FISC approves
procedures under Section 702, although it does not approve specific
selectors in advance.50
Rubinstein, Privacy and Security in the Cloud: Some Realism About Technical Solutions to
Transnational Surveillance in the Post-Snowden Era, 66 ME. L. REV. 487, 490 (2014). A
country’s consent to another state’s surveillance would address concerns about sovereignty but
would not trump human rights. See Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 25.
47. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012); see also David R. Shedd, Paul Rosenzweig & Charles
D. Stimson, Maintaining America’s Ability to Collect Foreign Intelligence: The Section 702
Program, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 13, 2016), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/
05/maintaining-americas-ability-to-collect-foreign-intelligence-the-section-702-program (noting
§ 702’s effectiveness at producing foreign intelligence); Chris Inglis & Jeff Kosseff, In Defense
of FAA Section 702: An Examination of Its Justification, Operational Employment, and Legal
Underpinnings (Hoover Inst. Series Paper No. 1604, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/defensefaa-section-702-examination-its-justification-operational-employment-and-legal-underpinnings
(same).
48. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b).
49. See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT 32–33 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf; cf. PPD-28 Supplemental
Procedures, supra note 27, para. 3.4, at 6 (noting that United States can collect “foreign private
commercial information or trade secrets” for limited purposes, such as detecting violations of fair
trade laws or sanctions, but not to supply U.S. firms with a competitive advantage).
50. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)–(i) (noting that the Attorney General and the Director of National
Intelligence must file certifications under Section 702 with FISC for review). Professor Daphna
Renan has helpfully analogized the FISC’s role to that of an administrative agency setting
parameters for a regulated industry. See Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative
Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1103–08 (2016); cf. Zachary K. Goldman, The Emergence
of Intelligence Governance, in GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: GOVERNING SECURITY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 207, 230–32 (Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds. 2016)
(discussing role of courts in framing incentives for executive action and forcing greater
transparency); Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2016)
(discussing role of the President in coordinating principled and collaborative approach to
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In contrast, bulk collection involves the collection of a mass of data,
which analysts subsequently query using selectors or other methods.51 In
bulk collection, much of the data collected is by definition substantively
irrelevant. Suppose that the government wishes to sort through the
content of communications in a foreign state to uncover individuals’
efforts to join ISIS, Al Qaeda, or the Taliban. Despite ISIS’s popularity
in some quarters, in any state only a tiny minority of communications will
concern ISIS recruiting—most will deal with countless other more
mundane issues, from personal, family, and business matters to
entertainment, recreation, and so on.52 However, collecting these
substantively irrelevant communications is nonetheless relevant
methodologically to a state’s efforts to protect its nationals or those of
other countries from ISIS.53 Bulk collection ensures that the government
has a database that is comprehensive when it searches for specific content
about ISIS recruiting. While scanning is evanescent because information
is not stored, collection gives the government access to communications
over time. That enables the government to search more effectively for
evolving patterns in ISIS’s communications. For example, if ISIS uses
different forms of encryption or code to hide its communications,
collecting information in bulk will allow the government to trace the
evolution of ISIS’s tradecraft. In contrast, relying on scanning or targeted
collection fails to reckon with ISIS’s ability to transform its tactics.
intelligence oversight); Carrie Cordero, A Response to Professor Samuel Rascoff’s Presidential
Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 104 (2016) (observing that the importance of speed and secrecy
in collecting intelligence to serve national interests will pose challenges for any comprehensive
regulatory scheme, and that position of Director of National Intelligence provides requisite
professionalism in intelligence collection together with insulation from politics).
51. PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, at 7 n.1 (defining bulk collection);
see also David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 209, 217–18 (2014) (discussing the bulk collection of domestic call record data and use of
identifiers to query such data under the USA Patriot Act prior to the effective date of the 2015
USA Freedom Act that reformed this program in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revelations).
52. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 78 (observing that
“terrorists and terrorist activity are rare” and “[d]ata specifically associated with terrorists . . . are
sparse”); Dempsey & Flint, supra note 45, at 1470 (noting that agencies searching for patterns
linked to terrorists “have a very small sample set on which to base their predictions”).
53. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, B.R.
No. 15-75, 2015 WL 5637562, at *7 (FISC June 29, 2015) (holding that the collection of metadata
under the pre-USA Freedom Act provision of the USA Patriot Act was “designed to permit the
government wide latitude to seek the information it needs to meet its national security
responsibilities”); Kris, supra note 51, at 235 (discussing FISC’s conception of relevance under
pre-USA Freedom Act statutory provision, Section 215 of USA Patriot Act, which has now been
amended to bar government collection of metadata and require the government to seek a court
order to obtain call records from telecommunications firms). But see ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d
787, 815–16 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that Section 215 defined information that was “relevant” to
an investigation in a narrower manner that did not authorize government collection of metadata).
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The United States has used bulk collection in two principal contexts.
First, before the USA Freedom Act became fully effective, the
government, with authorization from the FISC, collected most domestic
land-line call records (metadata, as opposed to content) detailing both
phone numbers called by persons in the United States and the duration of
the calls.54 After government officials brought overreaching to the
attention of the FISC in 2009, intelligence analysts restricted queries to
specific identifiers, such as phone numbers, that triggered a reasonable
and articulable suspicion (RAS) of links to terrorism.55
Second, even more importantly for this Article’s present discussion,
Executive Order 12,333 (EO 12,333), enacted during the Reagan
Administration, empowers the President, acting pursuant to a presidential
finding, to order surveillance abroad.56 While the Executive Branch has
54. Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign
Content Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 13 (2014); see also Kris, supra note 51,
at 235 (noting the government’s argument that “the telephony metadata must be available in bulk
to allow NSA to identify the records of terrorist communications because without access to the
larger haystack of data, it cannot find the needles using the much narrower querying process”).
Relying on the third-party doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that government access to
metadata, as opposed to content, does not pose a Fourth Amendment problem. See Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). That doctrine holds that individuals who voluntarily make
information available to third parties, such as phone companies that need metadata to complete
calls, have no reasonable expectation of privacy in such data. Id. at 743–44. But see SLOBOGIN,
supra note 2, at 156–58 (criticizing the third-party doctrine); Jonathan Mayer, Patrick Mutchler
& John C. Mitchell, Evaluating the privacy properties of telephone metadata, 113(20)
PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5536 (May 17, 2016) (using digital research and probabilistic
analysis to demonstrate that collection of metadata can have serious privacy consequences); cf.
Robert S. Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Digital Age, 126 YALE L.J. F. 8, 13–16 (2016)
(suggesting that courts should replace both third-party doctrine and “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test articulated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), with inquiry focusing on
how government handles data and the data’s intended use).
55. Margulies, supra note 54, at 45–46; cf. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 104–05 (2016) (criticizing the
program’s intrusiveness); Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and
Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 897–900 (2014) (criticizing the
statutory and constitutional predicate for the program); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive
Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721,
1757–58 (2014) (suggesting that Congress’s authorization for the program may have been
adequate under the applicable statute but arguing that courts should revive delegation theory to
curb executive discretion over the program’s nature and scope).
56. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941–43 (Dec. 4, 1981). EO 12,333 mirrors
provisions of the National Security Act that authorize covert action abroad based on a presidential
finding. See 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (2012); Steven G. Bradbury, The Developing Legal Framework for
Defensive and Offensive Cyber Operations, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 629, 640–41 (2011); cf.
Amos Toh, Faiza Patel & Elizabeth Goitein, Overseas Surveillance in an Interconnected World,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/overseassurveillance-interconnected-world (expressing concern about intrusiveness of collection under EO
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historically been reticent about operations conducted under EO 12,333,
the unprecedented openness ushered in by President Obama’s postSnowden January 2014 speech and the issuance of Presidential Policy
Directive 28 (PPD-28)57 support the inference that the government
engages in bulk collection of information abroad under an unspecified
authority not linked to FISA, which after all permits only targeted
collection. The most plausible inference from PPD-28 is that the authority
for bulk collection abroad stems from EO 12,333.58
Since the government defines “bulk” collection as the acquisition of
data without the aid of “specific” selectors,59 it is reasonable to assume
that bulk collection efforts overseas will have varying geographic and
temporal parameters. For example, bulk collection might include using
StingRay or comparable technology60 to collect all telephonic signals
within a neighborhood near a U.S. embassy abroad for twenty-four hours
because of otherwise unspecified reports of an imminent terrorist attack.
At the other pole of collection efforts, reports indicate that the United
States has collected in bulk the content of all telephonic traffic in
Afghanistan, where the United States today is still engaged in an armed
conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. To combat drug and human
trafficking, U.S. government agencies also apparently collect the contents
of mobile phone traffic in the Bahamas.61 In PPD-28, President Obama
barred collection for particular purposes, such as suppressing speech
critical of the United States, discriminating against racial, religious, or
ethnic groups, or gaining a competitive advantage for U.S. companies.62

12,333). See generally Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the
Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 539, 543 (2012) (providing background
on the statutory authority for covert action).
57. See PPD-28, supra note 27, at sec. 2.
58. See PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, at 7 n.1 (defining bulk collection
as the collection of “large quantities of SIGINT [signals intelligence] data that, because of
technical or operational considerations, is acquired without the use . . . of specific identifiers or
selection terms”).
59. Id.
60. See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret
Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on
National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14–15, 34, 55–56 (2014)
(describing StingRay as a portable device that gathers mobile phone signals within a relatively
narrow area).
61. See Jacob Kastrenakes, The NSA Is Capturing Nearly Every Phone Call in Afghanistan,
WikiLeaks Claims, VERGE (May 23, 2014, 9:41 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/23/57446
16/nsa-capturing-nearly-all-afghanistan-phone-calls; Devereaux et al., supra note 11.
62. See PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, at 5–6.
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B. Breaking Down Machine Searches
Having established that states can collect data in a targeted or “bulk”
fashion, this Article next considers how intelligence analysts search
through data. Searches can be either directed or autonomous. A directed
search sorts through data using keywords or other discrete pieces of data,
such as phone numbers, email addresses, URLs, or Internet Protocol
addresses.63 Analysts choose the “selectors” or “identifiers” used, and the
machine then dutifully searches the data available.64 Autonomous
searches are different. This Article uses the term autonomous to connote
searches in which machines do not merely execute searches formulated
by humans but instead engage in calculations that closely resemble
human reasoning.65 Commercial firms engage in autonomous searches
under the broad rubric of “data mining.”66 While there is no evidence that
the government has engaged in data mining of domestically collected
metadata,67 there are reasonable bases to infer that states, including the
United States, use autonomous data mining techniques on transnational
communications.68
To see how autonomous learning works, consider a setting familiar to
most lawyers: discovery.69 Suppose that plaintiffs had sued manufacturers
of air bags used in cars, claiming that the air bags deployed
63. See Kris, supra note 51, at 216.
64. See id. at 216–18.
65. The term autonomous has been used to describe technological advances such as selfdriving cars and computerized weapons systems that can operate independently of humans. See
George R. Lucas, Jr., Automated Warfare, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 324 (2014). This Article
adapts the term to the context of searches.
66. Danielle K. Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5, 26 (2014); see also SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 43 (listing
AOL and Netflix as examples of commercial firms that engage in autonomous searches).
67. Querying domestic metadata without RAS-approved identifiers would violate FISC
orders that govern domestic bulk collection. See Margulies, supra note 54, at 12–14.
68. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework,
43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 447 (2008); Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 262–63
(2008); see Bignami, supra note 21, at 633–34.
69. The case law on using autonomous searches to comply with electronic discovery
obligations is growing rapidly. See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D.
251, 261–62 (D. Md. 2008); William A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256
F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network v. Immigration & Customs
Enf’t Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87, 109–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287
F.R.D. 182, 186–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of Exabytes: Some Further
Thoughts on ‘Information Inflation’ and Current Issues in E-Discovery Search, RICH. J.L. &
TECH., Spring 2011, paras. 18, 20–21; cf. John Didday, Informed Buyers of E-Discovery: Why
General Counsel Must Become Tech Savvy, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 281, 306–07 (2013)
(discussing the promise of advanced machine learning in e-discovery).
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unpredictably, causing substantial injuries to passengers. Manufacturers
had millions of documents on air bags, but only a relatively small
number of documents were actually relevant to the plaintiffs’ claims.
Inspection by human beings would be time-consuming and inefficient
given the number of documents. A directed search using keywords
would generate large numbers of errors. For example, a keyword search
could generate an unmanageable number of false positives—documents
that the search flagged as relevant, even though the documents were
useless.70 Searching for a phrase such as “air bag” might yield thousands
of documents dealing with the different consumer warranties applicable
to the vehicle or labor relations in the factory that produced the item.
By the same token, a keyword search could produce many false
negatives—omitting documents because they did not fit the criteria
humans had chosen, even though those documents were in fact highly
relevant.71 For example, because of fear about litigation or regulatory
action, the manufacturer’s employees might have coyly discussed air
bag issues as “our problem” or “the question on the table.” Keyword
searches are not effective at ferreting out code, vague terms with
specific connotations, or other evasive or deceptive stratagems. 72
70. See Gregory L. Fordham, Using Keyword Search Terms in E-Discovery and How They
Relate to Issues of Responsiveness, Privilege, Evidence Standards and Rube Goldberg, RICH. J.L.
& TECH., Spring 2009, para. 10.
71. See Fordham, supra note 70, at para. 10; Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network, 877 F.
Supp. 2d at 110.
72. Fourth Amendment cases on protocols for digital searches of laptops pursuant to
lawfully obtained warrants are instructive on the deception that criminals use to hide their
handiwork. See, e.g., United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 238–39 (3d Cir. 2011) (suggesting
that law enforcement officials conducting digital searches pursuant to warrants need broad latitude
to address deceptive tactics used by criminals in labeling and storing files); United States v. Mann,
592 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing that “[u]nlike a physical object that can be
immediately identified as responsive to the warrant or not, computer files may be manipulated to
hide their true contents”); United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) (declining to
take a rigid approach to search protocols used to investigate a laptop covered by a warrant,
pertaining to deceptive labeling of computer files); Wolf v. State, 266 P.3d 1169, 1173–75 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2011) (allowing an officer broad discretion to search a computer based on an affidavit
describing that officer’s prior experience in child pornography investigations); cf. United States
v. Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 2013) (cautioning that judicial inclusion of detailed
search protocols in warrants authorizing laptop searches may unduly constrain law enforcement
efforts to unravel criminals’ deceptive data practices); Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for the
Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091, 1123 (2009)
(discussing the advantages of narrowly focused search protocols in laptop searches at U.S. border
entry points). But see In re Appeal of Application for Search Warrant, 71 A.3d 1158, 1182 & n.23
(Vt. 2012) (barring “sophisticated search techniques” beyond keyword searching absent specific
evidence that the suspect had tried to hide laptop files); Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of
Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241, 1255–58 (2010) (arguing that “[t]he search
protocol must forbid the use of tools that would discover illegality relating to evidence outside
the scope of the warrant”); see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d
1162, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (recommending that judges
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Autonomous searches can do a far better job.
An autonomous machine search will typically include four steps:
training, testing, application, and validation.73 In the first step, a
programmer will feed the machine data.74 In our air bag scenario, the
programmer will find both relevant data, including data that would not
show up on keyword searches, and irrelevant data. Feeding the machine
sufficient data trains the machine on the patterns that distinguish relevant
from irrelevant items.75 Programmers design the training process to
enable the machine to search not only for documents that match those in
the training set, but also for documents with patterns that are parallel or
analogous.76
In this space of analogous pattern detection, the machine exhibits a
human capacity to draw inferences and craft analogies, along with the
capacity to absorb and analyze vast amounts of data that far exceeds
human abilities.77 To ascertain whether the machine has been properly
trained, the programmer will test the machine on another data set.78 If the
machine can properly generalize lessons from the training set and apply
them to the data set, it passes the test.79 The machine is then put into
operation. In the air bag scenario, the computer would analyze the vast
trove of documents available to find patterns that matched those in the
training set. Programmers would then validate the machine’s
performance,80 perhaps by comparing the machine’s outputs to the results
of a sample of documents inspected by humans. If error levels were
adequate, the machine would be used again.81 If error levels were too
high, programmers would either scrap the machine search or refine it.82
Autonomous searches can be either supervised or unsupervised.83 The
search described in the air bag scenario is a supervised search, in which
programmers have certain objectives in mind and devise training and test
sets to meet those objectives.84 In unsupervised searches, a machine
include specific methodological criteria in warrants for laptop searches).
73. STÉPHANE TUFFÉRY, DATA MINING AND STATISTICS FOR DECISION MAKING 304 (2011).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 305–08; Steven M. Bellovin et al., When Enough Is Enough: Location
Tracking, Mosaic Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 556, 590–91 (2013).
76. See Bellovin et al., supra note 75, at 591.
77. See id. at 590–91.
78. See Lina Zhou et al., A Comparison of Classification Methods for Predicting Deception
in Computer-Mediated Communication, 20 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 139, 152 (2004).
79. See TUFFÉRY, supra note 73, at 542.
80. See PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING 19 (2012); RUSSEL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at
735; Bellovin et al., supra note 75, at 590–91 (2014).
81. See TUFFÉRY, supra note 73, at 542.
82. See id.
83. See Bellovin, supra note 75, at 591.
84. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 695.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 3

1064

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

might be given a massive amount of data, such as data from internet
users’ search histories, and tasked to find patterns that linked individual
users.85
C. The Search Deepens: Primary Machine Search Strategies
Understanding autonomous searches and how they might work in
national security intelligence collection requires more detail on the types
of searches that machines can perform. These include decision trees,
neural networks, and support vector machines. This Section briefly
discusses each in turn.
1. To Tree or Not to Tree: Decision Trees and Machine Learning
Decision trees are useful in making predictions and ascertaining
causation. In preparing a decision tree, a machine analyzes the factors
behind certain decisions or outcomes.86 A leaf in a decision tree
represents a causal factor and identifies how examples with and without
that attribute fared in achieving a particular outcome.87 A decision tree
will deliver an output that is consistent with the rule of Ockham’s Razor:
an explanation that is as simple as possible, given the data, with leaves
pruned away if they were unnecessary for prediction.88 For example, a
decision tree analyzing the Titanic shipwreck of 1912, in which almost
1500 people died, would establish that out of the countless variables
possessed by the passengers, gender and ticket class were the most
significant determinants of survival.89 A decision tree modeling websurfers’ choices for reading online posts might suggest that visitors are
more likely to read a post when the author is known, the thread is new,
and the post is short.90 Decision trees that search for relevant documents
in a large document database would consider the presence of certain
words and word combinations.91 For example, a decision tree that
identified documents on sophisticated financial transactions would look
for the word “swap” and then determine if the document flagged also
85. See FLACH, supra note 80, at 47.
86. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 698.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 696.
89. See TUFFÉRY, supra note 73, at 315–16. Gender was relevant because the Titanic’s
captain ordered that women and children move first to the lifeboats on board. Titanic: ‘Iceberg
Right Ahead,’ ULTIMATE TITANIC, http://www.ultimatetitanic.com/the-sinking/ (last visited
Nov. 18, 2016). Ticket class was relevant because first class passengers had quarters closest to
the ship’s main deck, where lifeboats were located. Id.
90. See 7.3.1 Learning Decision Trees, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: FOUND. OF
COMPUTATIONAL AGENTS, http://artint.info/html/ArtInt_177.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2016).
91. See Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, The Grossman-Cormack Glossary of
Technology-Assisted Review, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2013).
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contained the word “credit,” suggesting that the document discussed
“credit-default swaps,” one kind of complex transaction.92
A decision tree could also model what types of individuals abroad are
most likely to become ISIS recruits.93 Some of the variables would be
relatively obvious: the model would predict that recruits were more likely
to be young, male, and Muslim. However, these factors do not hold true
for all ISIS recruits94 or adequately separate that cohort from the far larger
population of non-ISIS recruits. To find ISIS recruits, a decision tree
might rely on other factors, such as employment history (to detect the
disaffected or alienated), information from facial recognition software
regarding attendance at events sponsored by radical clerics, search history
data showing visits to violent extremist sites, and social media posts,
texts, emails, or phone calls with known ISIS recruits.95
2. Machines and the Transparency Paradox: The Hidden Life of Neural
Networks
Artificial neural networks are more useful than decision trees in
performing certain search or identification tasks. However, technological
improvements are not a free lunch. The autonomous steps called “hidden
layers” that enhance these searches’ utility come at transparency’s
expense.
a. Artificial Neural Networks: Mimicking the Brain
Artificial neural networks are useful for discerning patterns between
individuals, groups, and objects or behaviors.96 Neural networks are
software applications that mimic the functioning of the human brain.97
The human brain works through neurons, which are the fundamental
functional unit of the nervous system.98 Fibers called dendrites branch out
92. See id.
93. Professor Stuart J. Russell and Peter Norvig, Google’s Director of Research, model a
more everyday, lower-stakes decision: whether to wait for a table at a crowded restaurant.
RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 698 (discussing the importance of common-sense factors
such as alternative restaurants, price, hunger, and estimated wait). The authors use this example
because of its familiarity. Their broader point, however, is that decision trees can also be a useful
strategy for more complex decisions. See id.
94. See Katrin Bennhold, Religion Meets Rebellion: How ISIS Lured 3 Friends, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 2015, at A1 (describing ISIS’s recruitment of three teenage girls in Britain).
95. A directed search using identifiers could pinpoint contacts of known ISIS operatives;
programmers could then integrate these outputs with an autonomous search looking for fresh
patterns.
96. Michael Aikenhead, The Uses and Abuses of Neural Networks in Law, 12 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 35–36 (1996).
97. Id. at 32; see RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 728.
98. See Aikenhead, supra note 96, at 34–35.
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from each neuron to others, as does a long fiber called the axon.99 The
interchange between neurons is called a synapse.100 As in the human
brain, neurons in an artificial network are interconnected but distinct,
enabling the neurons to break down complex problems into more
manageable component parts.101
In the human brain, all neurons fire at the same time—all neurons in
the human brain simultaneously send signals.102 Some signals might
transmit visual or auditory cues, while others may transmit bits of context
and memory.103 This simultaneous firing allows the human brain to
readily perform certain tasks, such as distinguishing between two small,
red, round, and organic objects, one of which is an apple and the other a
tomato. In contrast, even complex software that seeks to mimic the
human brain will generally not allow all artificial neurons in a network to
fire at once. For that reason, using neural networks for visual pattern
recognition is a sophisticated task, albeit one which has seen remarkable
progress.
i. Training Neural Networks
Neural networks use inductive learning algorithms that allow a
machine to draw inferences based on massive amounts of data.104 One
builds a neural network by deciding how many nodes or units are required
for a task, how to connect those nodes, and how to initialize the synaptic
“weights” that comprise a neural network’s primary means of long-term
storage.105 As with any form of machine learning, neural networks are
first trained with examples that the network digests with the aid of a
learning algorithm.106 Certain types of neural networks can then generate
outputs that find patterns between a new stimulus and data in the training
set.107 For example, suppose the training set for the neural network
consists of photos of suspected terrorists. Suppose further that the
network receives a new stimulus in the form of a small piece of one photo
from the training set. The network will readily reproduce the entire photo,
including that small piece.108
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. WITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 232–33.
102. Neurons and Their Jobs, NAT’L INST. ON AGING, https://www.nia.nih.gov/alzheimers/
publication/part-1-basics-healthy-brain/neurons-and-their-jobs (last updated Jan. 22, 2015).
103. Id.
104. See Aikenhead, supra note 96, at 34.
105. See WITTEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 235; Aikenhead, supra note 96, at 35.
106. See Aikenhead, supra note 96, at 35.
107. See id. at 35–36, 36 n.11.
108. See, e.g., Human Face Recognition Found in Neural Networks Based on Monkey
Brains, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/535176/
human-face-recognition-found-in-neural-network-based-on-monkey-brains/ (explaining how
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Neural networks connect inputs and outputs through hidden layers.109
Software engineers use multiple hidden layers because breaking down
the sorting of data into multiple steps allows greater precision than onestep sorting. Each layer performs a function that sorts out data from the
previous step.110
Consider how a neural network performs facial recognition—
detecting faces in a massive number of video images.111 Facial
recognition software breaks up that task, first searching for facial
features, such as eyes and noses. To detect eyes, software engineers will
use at least three hidden layers, each trained with image data.112 The first
layer will search for short edges in an image. 113 Eyes have short edges
compared to larger inanimate or inorganic objects, such as buildings or
trucks. However, another layer is necessary to categorize the particular

scientists have created a neural network based on a monkey’s brain that is able to recognize faces
and then match the face to an identity).
109. Zhou et al., supra note 78, at 149–50.
110. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 729. Hidden layers are also a feature of
another machine learning technique, support vector machines (SVMs). See WITTEN, ET AL., supra
note 1, at 191–92. One virtue of SVMs is that they deal effectively with data that has many
variables, and therefore many “dimensions” that an SVM can plot in space, using hyperplanes
that cleanly separate disparate groups. Id. at 223–25. Linear modes of data analysis such as graphs
can only plot two variables at a time, including the intersection of mass and acceleration to
compute force or age and education to help predict an individual’s likelihood of voting. Id. In
contrast, the hyperplanes derived by SVMs can separate groups along twenty or more variables.
Id. Using hidden layers, SVMs discern relationships between variables that humans would miss.
To illustrate how an SVM could aid in counterterrorism, consider the identification of ISIS
recruits through the relationship of a large number of variables, each of which alone might be
useless. For example, ISIS recruits might cite particular commentaries or interpretations of sacred
texts as authorizing violence. In addition, ISIS recruits might refer to such religious commentaries
or to operational and logistical details using code. A directed search would find only codes already
known to government officials. In contrast, a SVM could also find uses of language that were
analogous to known codes in syntax, frequency of word choice, and similar factors. The SVM
might detect new codes by grouping the incidence of certain word choices with other individual
behaviors, such as frequent visiting of chat rooms advocating violent extremism, use of specific
kinds of encryption, or patronage of stores selling burner phones. In this fashion, ISIS recruits that
would escape detection by humans, directed searches, or other autonomous searches would “pop”
in SVM outputs.
111. See, e.g., Human Face Recognition Found in Neural Network Based on Monkey Brains,
supra note 108. Use of facial recognition technology in either the domestic or transnational
context requires safeguards; for example, no state should use such technology to identify or target
political opponents. See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and
Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 545–
48 (2012).
112. See, e.g., Human Face Recognition Found in Neural Network Based on Monkey Brains,
supra note 108.
113. Id.
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short edge detected in the first layer.114 Depending on the perspective in
an image, a short edge could be part of an eye or part of a large inanimate
object, such as a truck, building, or rock formation, whose image had
short edges because it happened to be far away from the camera. This
second layer distinguishes between short edges that fit together in the
distinctive oval pattern typical of eyes and images in a more straightedged pattern that might indicate the presence of a distant inanimate
object.115 This layer is “hidden” because software engineers do not
impose specific quantitative parameters on the machine in this layer.
Instead, they feed the machine enough images to train the computer to
recognize distinctions between eyes and inanimate objects.116 A third
layer could search for a particular kind of face or even the face of an
individual.117
ii. Neural Networks and the Transparency Paradox
Hidden layers create a trade-off in machine learning. Given sufficient
data to sort through, hidden layers that rely on autonomous learning can
be extraordinarily accurate, yielding more true positives and fewer false
positives than directed searches.118 For example, a neural network with
hidden layers and a robotic arm can, given enough tries, learn to pick up
a ball as it generalizes from information that is available about the weight
and size of the ball and other factors.119 This task is elementary to humans
but actually involves a significant number of discrete steps. Combining
the ability to learn with the ability to absorb huge amounts of data, a
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey
of Policy and Implementation Issues 17–18 (Lancaster Univ. Mgmt. Sch., Working Paper No.
2010/030, 2010), http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/49012/1/Document.pdf. Another layer might perform
a similar operation to detect composed edges typical of the human nose. A further layer would
combine this search with the search for eyes. Similar image data can also train machines to
recognize other elements of human anatomy, such as arms and legs.
117. My goal here is to concisely explain how hidden layers work, not to explore the latest
developments in the fluid field of facial recognition, including the detection of individual faces.
For a discussion of recent developments, see Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 116, at 16–18;
Kirill Levashov, Note, The Rise of a New Type of Surveillance for Which the Law Wasn’t Ready,
15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 164, 167–70 (2013).
118. The benefit of hidden layers is the networks’ greater capacity to learn autonomously,
compared with other machines such as decision trees. A machine that learns autonomously with
a large amount of data will typically outperform a machine with less data, even when the second
machine has been programmed with a workable algorithm. See RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note
17, at 756–57.
119. Dana S. Rao, Note, Neural Networks: Here, There, and Everywhere—An Examination
of Available Intellectual Property Protection for Neural Networks in Europe and the United
States, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 509, 512–13 (1996–1997).
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neural network can also autonomously discern patterns in photographs,
voice recordings, or other types of data120 with a level of efficiency that
no human could possibly match. However, the superior accuracy of such
autonomous layers comes at the cost of humans’ ability to substantively
explain the inferential reasoning that occurs in each layer.121 Since the
hidden layer’s search is autonomous, not directed, the human analyst
cannot cite specific parameters that the analyst programs into the
machine.122 As noted, the analyst refrains from imposing such parameters
because they would yield results that are less accurate.123
In the absence of a substantive explanation, the analyst can only offer
a methodological explanation: the network’s hidden layers have searched
for patterns that distinguish most accurately between human eyes and
other image components.124 An analyst can also describe how she has
validated the autonomous machine search’s results.125 The law governing
searches must decide if machine learning’s validated accuracy,
accompanied by a methodological explanation, outweighs the lack of a
specific, articulable substantive explanation.
The contrast between substantive and methodological explanations of
machine searches becomes most salient in searches designed to predict
human conduct, including criminality or terrorism. To satisfy U.S.
statutory or constitutional requirements, a government official would
120. See Dave Gershgorn, These Are What the Google Artificial Intelligence’s Dreams Look
Like, POPULAR SCIENCE (June 19, 2015), http://www.popsci.com/these-are-what-googleartificial-intelligences-dreams-look (explaining Google’s approach to teaching an artificial
neutral network what a fork is).
121. See Zhou et al., supra note 78, at 150–51; Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning,
Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 906 (2016).
122. See Zhou et al., supra note 78, at 150–51 (explaining that because of hidden layers’ role
in connecting inputs and outputs, which gives neural networks a “highly nonlinear structure,”
there is no definitive way “to easily interpret the relative strength of each input to each output in
the network”). This confluence of accuracy and difficulty in substantive explanation is not
confined to machines. It extends to other nonhuman search aids. For example, drug-sniffing dogs
are often extraordinarily accurate in detecting traces of contraband. Humans, whose sense of smell
is laughably crude by comparison, lack any detailed substantive or scientific explanation of the
physiology behind dogs’ uncanny olfactory accuracy. See Rich, supra note 121, at 911–12. A
warrant application or a legal justification of a warrantless search based on a drug-sniffing dog’s
reaction will not try to quantitatively classify a smell as so many parts per million. Instead, the
legal justification will be methodological in nature. The justification will describe the dog’s
reaction, on the theory that the canine reaction alone is sufficient demonstration of the presence
of drugs. A methodological explanation is sufficient based on validated scientific techniques that
using dogs works.
123. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1519–20 (noting
that in many cases using only techniques that would permit a substantive, verbal explanation of
the machine’s calculations would reduce the accuracy of the search).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1520.
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generally need to present substantive reasons in favor of a warrant.126
Authorization for a search would depend on probable cause or a
reasonable suspicion that the subject of a search had committed or was in
the process of conspiring to commit a specific criminal act. 127 For
example, the government might seek to show that an individual was
conspiring to provide material support, including money, arms, or more
intangible assistance, to ISIS or another foreign terrorist group.128 The
warrant application would include specific substantive information
bolstering this conclusion, such as a conversation between the subject and
a government informant.
In contrast, an autonomous machine search for ISIS recruits would
typically not yield such a substantive justification. Instead, an
autonomous search—even one of publicly available databases not
protected by the Fourth Amendment—would find patterns that might
include an individual’s opinions, associations, and types of behavior.
Given enough data, an autonomous search could infer a reasonable risk
that a given individual was an ISIS recruit based on myriad patterns that
might include expressions of political opinion in chat rooms, a recent
report of a lost passport (indicating an attempt to conceal a visit to a
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan or Pakistan), attempts to use or
deploy a common encryption technique, and patronage (picked up
through public video surveillance and facial recognition software) of a
store specializing in pre-paid cell phones.129 This convergence of
variables might be predictive of terrorist activity but would likely not in
itself be sufficient to satisfy the U.S. Constitution’s probable cause
standard.130

126. United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972).
127. Cf. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring showing
of probable cause to obtain the contents of emails); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 505
(11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that locational data was available upon individualized
statutory showing, requiring “specific and articulable facts showing reasonable grounds to believe
the records [or other information sought] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation,” while noting that this statutory showing was less rigorous than probable cause).
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
1, 8 (2010) (upholding the constitutionality of material support statute against vagueness and First
Amendment challenges); Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors,
and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455, 486–93 (2012) (defending the Humanitarian Law
Project’s decision that upheld limits on active relationships with foreign terrorist groups, based
in part on the difficulty of gaining information about such groups’ activities abroad).
129. Let us suppose that either the machine or a human analyst assessing search results would
also apply a test for false positives, such as information that a particular individual flagged by the
search was a lawyer, journalist, academic, or human rights researcher.
130. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983) (holding that probable cause is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place).
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Moreover, in an unsupervised learning mode, the machine would use
hidden layers to analyze multiple variables.131 Because of the number of
variables that the hidden layers crunched, an analyst would not be able to
retrieve a substantive, verbal explanation of how those variables
interacted to generate a particular result. Indeed, assuming enough
inputted data, the machine’s search would be valuable precisely to the
extent that it detected patterns that would have eluded a human analyst.
Even then, however, a definitive conclusion about a positive result from
a particular machine search would benefit from follow-up investigation
by counterterrorism officials.132 Moreover, for every “true positive”—a
bona fide ISIS recruit—identified through such follow-up, several false
positives might emerge: individuals flagged by the machine search who
were in fact not ISIS recruits.
In this scenario, a paradox emerges. Let us take the best-case scenario
in which a follow-up investigation identifies otherwise undetected ISIS
recruits, with a minimal number of false positives. Let us assume that a
machine search of this type will yield results that are superior to sole
reliance on either human intelligence or a directed search using contacts
of known terrorists. Human access to the search results might still be
arbitrary under international human rights law, if one defined a nonarbitrary search as one entailing a substantive verbal explanation of the
factors giving rise to the search. After all, as previously noted, the
machine search’s hidden layers would preclude just such a substantive
verbal explanation. However, finding human access to such search results
to be arbitrary would create an anomaly: less accurate results, such as
those based on the assertions of an informant with an axe to grind, would
comply with human rights norms, while more accurate results would not.
This Article resolves the transparency paradox in Part V; the goal here is
to simply flag the problem.
D. The Accuracy of Machine Learning as a Counterterrorism Tool
The discussion above regarding the accuracy of certain machine
learning techniques raises an issue that is as hotly debated as any in the
study of counterterrorism surveillance law and policy: the accuracy of
machine learning in the national security space.133 Privacy advocates,
including those with significant technical expertise, claim that machine
learning in this context is ineffective because data is insufficient—the
needles are too small and the haystack too large.134 As this Article shows
131. See supra notes 109–17 and accompanying text.
132. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 206.
133. See, e.g., id. at 207–09 (highlighting policy makers’ decision-making strategies when
evaluating the “trade off” between privacy and accuracy in data mining).
134. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 136–38 (quoting former NSA Director General
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below, however, critics of counterterrorism machine searches sometimes
skew the definitions of outputs to reinforce their arguments. Other
technologists, however, while acknowledging the difficulties of machine
searches in this context, also concede that these searches could have
“substantial benefits.”135 If one believes that technology improves
exponentially over time, this latter view provides the basis for cautious
optimism about the role of national security machine searches.
Any candid analysis of machine learning in counterterrorism must
acknowledge a crucial problem: to be effective, machine searches need
data to compare and analyze. Terrorism, although a huge problem with
devastating consequences, is relatively rare.136 Terrorists do not need to
command the allegiance of the majority of the population to have an
impact; if they did, ISIS, which probably has no more than 30,000 armed
fighters,137 would be a paltry force in the Middle East, which is home to
more than 200 million people.138 Since, by any count, terrorists are
relatively rare, mobilizing the data to input into machines is a major
challenge.139
If data is insufficient, machine searches are likely to “overfit” the
training data.140 That is, a machine will simply “memorize” the
characteristics of known terrorists, including those that are irrelevant to
the subject’s terrorist status.141 When a sample is large, irrelevant
characteristics will likely be evenly distributed among true positives and
negatives. However, when the sample is small, chance may create a spike
in certain irrelevant factors. For example, in a small sample, a
disproportionate number of individuals labeled as positives might have a
common birthday or might be left-handed. These attributes clearly have
no bearing on whether the individual is an ISIS recruit. A machine might
“overfit” its training data, however, by treating such irrelevant factors as
Keith Alexander arguing that “you need the haystack to find the needle”); see also NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 13 (noting that a massive amount of
data must be analyzed to distinguish between terrorist activities and legitimate ones, and that
innocent people’s data will be collected, resulting in a privacy issue).
135. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 196.
136. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 137.
137. See Jim Michaels, New U.S. Intelligence Estimate Sees 20-25K ISIL Fighters, USA
TODAY (Feb. 4, 2016, 5:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/02/03/isilfighters-new-estimate-25000-iraq-syria/79775676/.
138. See Population: Middle East, INDEX MUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/map/?
v=21&r=me&l=en (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
139. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 136–38.
140. FLACH, supra note 80, at 6; RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 17, at 709, 736; WITTEN ET
AL., supra note 1, at 18–19, 29.
141. Cf. FLACH, supra note 80, at 6 (explaining a phenomenon called overfitting, where a
machine will learn all the characteristics of past information but cannot generalize it to new, future
information).
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part of its working hypothesis for predicting terrorist status. That would
make the hypothesis a poor basis for generalizing about the presence of
terrorism in a larger population. Programmers can address overfitting, but
in the absence of enough data, a machine still lacks the ingredients for an
accurate search. For the most ardent critics of surveillance, this problem
is insurmountable.142
While the surveillance critics raise strong points, particularly on the
effect of data on accuracy,143 their arguments are less persuasive than they
might appear. First, machine searches could be very effective at
pinpointing confluences of facts that suggest terrorist plots, such as
contact between an individual that facial recognition technology showed
was taking photographs of New York City landmarks and another
individual buying large quantities of explosives.144 Moreover, the critics
stack the deck when they posit that a machine search must uncover
imminent attacks to be considered effective.145 The critics are right that
imminent attacks are rare, once one leaves sites of armed conflict such as
Afghanistan. However, in a conflict zone, attacks are more frequent. The
United States and other states have a legitimate interest in detecting
planned attacks in conflict zones.146 In addition, the thousands of ISIS
recruits that have traveled or conspired to travel to the Middle East147 are
a more substantial group than the isolated ring of conspirators that
surveillance critics posit. Fortunately, the number of ISIS recruits does
not approach the numbers of Amazon customers or Gmail users that
private firms mine.148 However, the cohort of active ISIS recruits may be
big enough to provide generalizable data. Indeed, ISIS’s reliance on
social media149 may actually make its adherents more like the commercial
internet users that private firms mine for purchasing habits. As
surveillance critics concede, data mining is good at finding mutual tastes
142. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 139 (asserting that the problems with data mining
for terrorists “cannot be fixed”).
143. Cf. Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L.
REV. 773, 812–16 (2015) (discussing the application of the Daubert test on scientific evidence to
validate machine searching techniques).
144. See PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM 232–33 (2015) (noting that machine
searches of contacts and records can uncover patterns of criminal activity, even when specific
data points seems “innocent enough in isolation”).
145. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 138.
146. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 115.
147. Eric Schmitt & Somini Sengupta, Thousands Enter Syria to Join ISIS Despite Global
Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/world/middleeast/
thousands-enter-syria-to-join-isis-despite-global-efforts.html?.
148. See Sean Madden, How Companies Like Amazon Use Big Data to Make You Love
Them, FAST COMPANY (May 2, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.fastcodesign.com/1669551/howcompanies-like-amazon-use-big-data-to-make-you-love-them; Gibbs, supra note 42.
149. Schmitt & Sengupta, supra note 147.
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and detecting joint participation in events.150 Keeping track of who
attends ISIS’s virtual recruitment fairs may in fact play to machine
searches’ strengths.
In addition, if the actual data set of ISIS recruits is still not large
enough, that does not necessarily mean that counterterrorism officials
must write off data mining. Creative programmers can find workarounds, including populating a data set with “synthetic” data: virtual
replicas of actual terrorists that can augment sample size and permit
rudimentary validation of a machine search.151
Moreover, the experience of the government thus far reinforces the
case for cautious optimism about machine searches. While some
programs have ended in futility, some specialized government data
mining programs, such as those focused on fraud, have established a
niche.152 The government’s USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act) metadata
program, although it did not catch any terrorists on the brink of an attack,
supplied a useful lead in an investigation of a plot to bomb New York
subways.153
Finally, the trove of documents leaked by Edward Snowden, which
one would assume are “Exhibit A” for surveillance critics, in fact suggest
that machine learning may be helpful.154 Consider the targeted
surveillance reports on conversations between an Australian, who wished
to join the Taliban, and his girlfriend.155 While critics claim that the
girlfriend was a false positive, her conversations with her aspiring
Taliban-member boyfriend reveal his deepening radicalization and the
streak of male control fixation that accompanied it.156 That window into
the Australian’s motives, which might generalize to other terrorist
recruits, reinforces the value of overseas intelligence collection. True, it
appears that the conversations between the aspiring Taliban and his
150. SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 140 (finding that “political dissidents are likely to share a
well-defined profile”).
151. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 81.
152. Id. at 235–36.
153. See Margulies, supra note 54, at 15. The metadata program first supplied this lead,
although it might have been available from other sources. See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION
215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 150 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on
_the_ Telephone_Records_Program.pdf.
154. See id. at 1.
155. Barton Gellman et al., In NSA-Intercepted Data, Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber
the Foreigners Who Are, WASH. POST (July 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-whoare/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html.
156. Id.
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girlfriend were collected as part of the targeted Section 702 program,157
not an autonomous search. However, it seems reasonable to assume that
some of the selectors used in the Section 702 program, which largely
belong to persons outside the United States, first came to light through
autonomous search techniques.
II. MACHINE VERSUS HUMAN ACCESS TO DATA
Now with a basic grasp of how machine searches work, this Article
can address a normative question: how intrusive are machine searches?
Surveillance critics state two normative objections to machine access to
data. The deontological objection frames privacy as a right that inherently
protects the individual against all manner of intrusions, whether by
people or machines.158 In contrast, the consequentialist objection cites the
risk that governments, corporations, or other individuals will misuse
personal information.159 Champions of a state-centric approach discount
the deontological implications of computer access and the risks of
adverse consequences.160 In contrast, government critics and privacy
advocates argue that under either a deontological or consequentialist
reading, machine and individual access pose risks of equivalent severity.
This Article argues for a middle ground that recognizes that, while
machine access poses both deontological and consequentialist risks,
appropriate safeguards can address these concerns.
A. The Deontological Objection to Machine Access
Many privacy advocates’ arguments suggest that machine access
violates central aspects of personhood. Professor Julie Cohen, for
example, has written that pervasive machine access by private sector
firms tracking individuals’ internet use intrudes on humans’ sense of
control and self.161 According to Professor Cohen, certain types of
157. Id.
158. While the deontological view is an important touchstone in thinking about privacy,
many contemporary legal scholars deal with either direct or more intangible consequences of
privacy intrusions. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1909–
10 (2013) (discussing theories of the self, while also linking privacy with participation in
democratic governance); cf. SLOBOGIN, supra note 2, at 94–95 (surveying research suggesting
individual’s knowledge of ubiquitous surveillance may limit spontaneity). But see Daniel J.
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1145 & nn. 342–44 (2002) (citing
sources while rejecting the deontological view).
159. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934,
1945–47, 1951 (2013) (discussing the importance of privacy in the ability to think freely without
government intimidation); Solove, supra note 158, at 1151 (arguing that protecting privacy
prevents “exercises of power employed to destroy or injure individuals”).
160. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 9, at 249–51.
161. Cohen, supra note 158, at 1910–11, 1916–17 (discussing spontaneity and play in the
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machine access, such as scanning email to tailor behavioral advertising
to individual users, inhibit individuals’ capacity to develop their own
values and preferences through trial and error.162 Burdened by the
awareness that machines are monitoring the content of their
communications, individuals will be less spontaneous—less willing to
make mistakes.163 If the freedom to make mistakes is an essential
ingredient of personal autonomy, then for Professor Cohen machine
access abridges that autonomy.
A state-centric account would take the opposite tack. On this view,
machine access alone, uncoupled from human access, has no
deontological privacy implications.164 This view holds that only beings
with a certain level of consciousness can intrude on privacy.165 Forms of
life such as animals lack consciousness in the human sense and therefore
cannot intrude. No one regards a dog or cat as intruding on his privacy,
even if it saw him without clothes.166 A computer, on this reading, is
similarly unintrusive, as long as it is uncoupled from human access.167
Intuitions about privacy do not entirely square with the deontological
objection to machine surveillance. Most privacy advocates rely, either
expressly or implicitly, on the metaphor of the “gaze.” Professor Jeffrey
Rosen, for example, in his groundbreaking work, The Unwanted Gaze,
repeatedly uses examples of privacy intrusions such as the public
disclosures of Monica Lewinsky’s sexual history with then-President Bill
Clinton168 and the disclosures of individuals’ sexual histories and
communications in sexual harassment litigation.169 In each of these
instances, the intrusion on privacy arose from the knowledge acquired by
other people and the prospect of others’ amusement, pity, or disdain.
That said, the state-centric dismissal of the equivalency theory also is
too facile. While one cannot fully quantify or predict the costs to self of
ubiquitous machine access, it seems reasonable to assume that such
development of selfhood, and suggesting that systematic intrusions by the government and
corporations adversely affects such development).
162. Id. at 1916–18.
163. Id.
164. See Posner, supra note 9, at 254.
165. See id.
166. Ross Andersen, An Eye Without an ‘I’: Justice and the Rise of Automated Surveillance,
ATLANTIC (June 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/06/an-eyewithout-an-i-justice-and-the-rise-of-automated-surveillance/258082/.
167. Dan Froomkin, The Computers Are Listening: How the NSA Converts Spoken Words
Into Searchable Text, INTERCEPT (May 5, 2015, 10:08 AM), https://firstlook.org/
theintercept/2015/05/05/nsa-speech-recognition-snowden-searchable-text/ (quoting Kim
Taipale, Stilwell Center for Advanced Studies in Science and Technology Policy, as noting that
“[a]utomated analysis has different privacy implications” than access to data by human analysts).
168. JEFFREY ROSEN, UNWANTED GAZE 4–6, 8 (2000).
169. Id. at 88–94.
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comprehensive surveillance would make people more wary of making
mistakes. That reticence would lead to less experimentation and perhaps
less personal growth. Universal machine access might also induce an
anxiety that undermined personal well-being, even when more tangible
indicia of welfare showed improvement.
In addition, the deontological objection to full machine access may
reflect developments in artificial intelligence that have brought
computers closer to human beings. It is unlikely that computers possess
even the consciousness and affective attributes, such as anger or fear,
attributable to household pets. However, every day researchers add to the
repertoire of judgments that computers can make. It is now routine to
subject machines performing searches or other autonomous activities to
penalties for exceeding certain parameters and to reward machines for
good performance.170 Those penalties and rewards may not produce
emotions such as guilt or shame, but they indicate that computers can
respond to stimuli. Indeed, the extraordinary progress in machine
learning over the past few decades has far exceeded humans’ ability to
change. If providing information to an entity that can process that data in
a sophisticated fashion instills perceptions of loss of control, machine
access may undermine perceptions of control far more readily than access
by other humans, let alone dogs or cats.
B. The Consequentialist Objection
Machine access also draws consequentialist objections. For example,
machines may be largely responsible for implementing certain
counterterrorism tools, including no-fly lists.171 These lists have a
significant number of errors, including both false positives and false
negatives.172 Inclusion on a no-fly list can hamper individuals’ ability to
travel to the United States and possibly to other countries. Because
officials may overestimate a machine’s accuracy,173 they rarely remove
individuals from such lists.174 When hidden layers reduce the
170. See FLACH, supra note 80, at 131 (discussing the use of a penalty for a machine that set
predictive criteria that were too complex to efficiently generalize to future cases).
171. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 214.
172.The late Senator Ted Kennedy was sometimes delayed in boarding because his name
matched one on the list. See PETER MARGULIES, LAW’S DETOUR: JUSTICE DISPLACED IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 44–45 (2010). Errors in the no-fly list have attracted greater attention after the
June 2016 ISIS-inspired mass shooting at an Orlando nightclub because of legislative proposals
to bar those on the list from buying guns. See Molly O’Toole & Paul McLeary, Here’s How
Terrorism is Scrambling America’s Gun Debate, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 21, 2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/21/heres-how-terrorism-is-scrambling-americas-gun-debate/.
173. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 206.
174. See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1161 (D. Or. 2014) (holding that the
Department of Homeland Security’s process for correcting the erroneous placement of travelers
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transparency of machine outputs, these problems multiply. While such
searches can be more accurate than other types, flaws in inputted data
will compromise outputs.175 Some of these concerns are best addressed
through a robust framework for correcting errors.176 Nevertheless, such
concerns reinforce the consequentialist objection to machine access.
Errors in machine searches may prompt further harms. For example,
states might detain individuals because of outputs from machine searches.
Prolonged detention based solely on a machine search would be arbitrary
and hence a violation of the ICCPR. An individual could also be subject
to counterterrorism sanctions because of a flawed search.177 In addition,
flawed search results could affect targeting decisions by states engaged
in armed conflicts with violent extremists. In a provocative and
intentionally hyperbolic remark, former NSA (and CIA) Director General
Michael Hayden asserted, “We kill people based on metadata.”178 In fact,
the process used by the United States for targeted killings is far more
on the no-fly list left them stranded on the list indefinitely and violated their procedural due
process rights); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 929–31 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(same); Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J.
(forthcoming 2016) (discussing litigation over no-fly lists and finding that “[w]hile people like
Ted Kennedy did not remain on the no-fly list for long, less connected individuals like Rahinah
Ibrahim and many others were not so lucky, receiving recourse after many years, if at all”); cf.
Abdelfattah v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 529–43 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (detailing lawful
resident plaintiff’s difficulties with repeated security checks that information in government
databases may have prompted and holding that plaintiff could seek relief under both the Privacy
Act and the U.S. Constitution, but denying relief because the plaintiff had not established a factual
basis, including tangible harm, for the relief sought).
175. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 76 (discussing errors
when machine searches inspect multiple databases, each of which may have incorrect inputs).
176. Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due Process of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 804, 810 (2007). The government has established a program to directly handle
complaints about difficulties in boarding aircraft that may be due to erroneous inclusion on a
terrorist watch list. See DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-trip. Recently, the government
expanded the information it would provide to travelers who encountered such difficulties. See
Dibya Sarkar, Justice Department Revises Procedures for Individuals on No-Fly List Seeking
Redress, FIERCEGOVERNMENTIT (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/story/justi
ce-department-revises-procedures-individuals-no-fly-list-seeking-redre/2015-04-16. A program
like DHS TRIP is a useful supplement to, but not a substitute for, a program that would address
complaints about wrongful data collection and retention. Wrongful collection or retention or flawed
data inputs that conflate an innocent with a terrorist can manifest themselves in a range of harms;
difficulty in boarding an aircraft is just one of them. In such cases, it is more effective to address
the problem at the source. The DHS TRIP program shows that such redress is feasible.
177. See Peter Margulies, Aftermath of an Unwise Decision: The U.N. Terrorist Sanctions
Regime After Kadi II, 6 AMSTERDAM L.F. 51, 52–53 (2014).
178. Lee Ferran, Ex-NSA Chief: ‘We Kill People Based on Metadata,’ ABC NEWS
(May 12, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-kill-peoplebased-on-metadata/.
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diligent, methodical, and comprehensive than the general’s off-hand
remark suggested.179 Despite concerns about autonomous weapons, no
one claims that the United States or any other state targets individuals
based solely on a machine search. That said, if flawed machine outputs
play a role because individual officials are unwilling or unable to follow
up, that deficit should also figure in the consequentialist calculus.
In sum, while surveillance critics overstate the force of the
deontological objection to machine access, this objection cannot be
completely dismissed. Similarly, consequentialist objections to machine
surveillance have some foundation. This does not mean that human rights
law should preclude machine surveillance or treat it as equivalent to
human access in all contexts. However, the risk of deontological and
consequential harms points toward the need for safeguards.
III. AGAINST THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE: STATE CAPABILITIES
NEED NOT DRIVE MACHINE SEARCH PRACTICES
With the above discussion as a predicate, this Article now examines
the flaws in the second equivalency proposition, which this Article calls
the technological imperative: the descriptive claim that in matters of
surveillance, a state’s capabilities determine its practices.180 Viewed in a
more modest light, this claim is sound; indeed, in a speech announcing
reforms in overseas intelligence collection, President Obama
acknowledged the “inevitable bias [in government] . . . to collect more
information about the world, not less.”181 However, as an ironclad
prediction about state practice, the technological imperative fails to
deliver because it unduly discounts technological, legal, and political
constraints on democratic governments.
The technological imperative reflects an incomplete acknowledgment
of technology’s role in privacy matters. While privacy advocates often
view increasing technological sophistication solely as a threat to privacy,
this perspective is too limiting. Technological advances such as search
filters can preserve privacy by regulating government surveillance
179. Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 685 (2014)
(concluding based on document review and interviews that U.S. targeting decisions involved
elaborate analysis engaged in by dozens or even hundreds of officials); cf. Ferran, supra note 178
(indicating that General Hayden did not make his remarks about metadata in the course of
describing U.S. targeted killing procedures but instead highlighted that the Patriot Act domestic
metadata program required directed searches based on identifiers linked to terrorism and did not
allow autonomous machine searches).
180. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
181. Transcript of President Obama’s Jan 17 Speech on NSA Reforms, WASH. POST (Jan.
17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-jan-17-speech
-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.
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officials.182 For example, search filters can prevent analysts from gaining
access to machine-generated data unless the analysts use pre-approved
queries. Software can also monitor analyst’s online work to ensure that
analysts do not try to circumvent such safeguards or otherwise
overreach.183
As a descriptive matter, the technological imperative also unduly
discounts the force of law. In an unprecedented summary of norms
governing intelligence collection, NSA officials implementing President
Obama’s PPD-28 guidance to respect privacy worldwide declared that
signals intelligence scanning, collection, processing, and retention should
be “as tailored as feasible.”184 NSA has also stated that it will prioritize
reliance on “diplomatic and public sources.”185 Admittedly, these
guidelines preserve much of the intelligence agencies’ flexibility, since
the terms “feasible” and “prioritize” do not expressly preclude other
options. Nevertheless, it would be glib to dismiss the importance of such
constraints.
Guidelines such as those implementing PPD-28 start a conversation,
which in itself is valuable in the often-closed world of intelligence
collection.186 In the future, if intelligence agencies give in too readily to
the temptation to “collect it all” that the technological imperative
describes, privacy advocates can cite the government’s own guidelines in
seeking positive change. Legislators as well as bodies such as the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) can provide oversight. In

182. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 72; cf. John
DeLong, Aligning the Compasses: A Journey through Compliance and Technology, IEEE
Security and Privacy, at 85, 86–88 (July–Aug. 2014) (discussing importance of technology that
promotes compliance with legal rules); Litt, supra note 54, at 18 (same).
183. See id. (discussing individual audit records that compile all queries and permit
comparison between analysts to detect anomalies that might indicate overreaching); Nathan
Alexander Sales, Mending Walls: Information Sharing After the USA PATRIOT Act, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 1795, 1853 (2010) (same); see also In re Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13,
2009 WL 9150913, at *5, *7–8 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009) (discussing technological safeguards);
Margulies, supra note 54, at 44 (same); Pozen, supra note 24, at 236–38 (same); Gellman et al.,
supra note 155 (including comments by Robert Litt, General Counsel for the Director of National
Intelligence, on technological safeguards).
184. PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, para. 3.5, at 6.
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Transcript of President Obama’s Jan 17 Speech on NSA Reforms, supra note
181. For an argument that intelligence agencies and their lawyers prior to Snowden’s disclosures
failed to model this kind of proactive conversation, see Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism
and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112 (2015); cf.
Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security Executive, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 289, 340–41 (2015) (discussing virtues and risks of establishing units in the U.S. Executive
Branch to promote internal compliance with civil and human rights).
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addition, the proposal advanced below187 would empower an independent
body to decide if the government was adopting the measured outlook
captured in the guidelines. Officials may still push the envelope, but they
will get pushback if they do.
Skeptics about the government’s ability or willingness to live within
the law on surveillance also too quickly discount the government’s track
record in the three years prior to Snowden’s revelations. Consider the
post-2009 record of the government on the pre-USA Freedom Act
domestic metadata program that limited analysts’ access to call record
information. In 2009, the FISC took charge of enforcing limits that
required an intelligence analyst to use only RAS-approved identifiers
(RAS stands for “reasonable articulable suspicion”) in queries of the
database.188 Diligent media efforts in the post-Snowden period have
uncovered only a handful of violations of the RAS standard out of the
billions of call records the government acquired.189
As noted above, skeptics about the U.S. government’s focus on
tailored collection abroad do not fully reckon with the government’s track
record of retrieving such tailored intelligence. Consider again the report
by journalists working with Edward Snowden describing surveillance on
the Australian national who tried to join the Taliban and conversed with
his girlfriend during his quest.190 Much of the conversation recorded dealt
with the Taliban aspirant’s motivations for extremism, which would be
relevant. In addition, as the girlfriend acknowledged to reporters, she was
troubled about the target’s extremist bent. This attitude would make her
a possible informant if the target ever decided to resume his quest for a
more active role with the Taliban. If the technological imperative were
an adequate description of U.S. practice, surely journalists with access to
Snowden’s copious files could have come up with a better example.
In addition, privacy advocates arguing that state capabilities
necessarily drive intelligence practices do not pay sufficient attention to
their own efforts, or to other forces countering the state. In the postSnowden era, privacy advocates will have a seat at the table on
187. See infra Section V.C.
188. See In re Production of Tangible Things, No. BR 08-13, 2009 WL 9150913 at *2. The
FISC became involved because intelligence community officials disclosed to the FISC in early
2009 that the NSA had earlier used non-RAS-approved identifiers. See Margulies, supra note 54,
at 45–48.
189. See Ryan Gallagher, How NSA Spies Abused Their Powers to Snoop on Girlfriends,
Lovers, and First Dates, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2013, 11:19 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_
tense/2013/09/27/loveint_how_nsa_spies_snooped_on_girlfrgirlf_lovers_and_first_dates.html
(detailing that the NSA, through lie detector tests routinely given to employees, uncovered twelve
instances since 2003 in which analysts spied on intimate partners or engaged in other collection
activities barred by agency procedures).
190. See Gellman et al., supra note 155.
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surveillance policy.191 Moreover, U.S. companies eager to dispel the
impression that they are mere vassals of the U.S. intelligence community
will also push back. Finally, other countries will make their voices
heard.192
The claim that technology determines state surveillance is most
plausible as a warning of what will happen if adequate safeguards are not
in place. A more modest version of the technology-determines-practice
claim might generate less heat in mobilizing privacy advocates, but it
would also shed more light.
IV. EQUIVALENCY AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Now comes the third component of the equivalency thesis: the
proposition that a state must accord equivalent rights to persons within
its own borders and persons located overseas with no ties to that state.193
Here, there is also a statist counterpart: the claim that the ICCPR does not
apply extraterritorially.194 As in the other issues previously discussed,
both the statist and equivalency claims miss the mark. This Part addresses
the statists’ claim, which conflicts with the ICCPR’s language, structure,
and purpose.195
The statist view finds support in a superficial reading of the ICCPR’s
language. Article 2(1) of the agreement obligates each state party “to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”196 The
191. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT (2012) (analyzing both
President Bush’s and President Obama’s counterterrorism programs and finding that presidents
act with greater discretion and secrecy during times of war).
192. See Deeks, supra note 8, at 330.
193. See Emmerson, supra note 12, para. 43, at 16.
194. This is the U.S. position. See STATE DEP’T PERIODIC REPORTS, supra note 8, at Annex
1; Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed
Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 124–26 (2005) (defending the U.S.
view). The United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal shares this view. See Human Rights
Watch v. Sec’y of State, paras. 52–63 (Investig. Powers Trib. 2016), http://www.bailii.org/uk/cas
es/UKIPTrib/2016/15_165-CH.html.
195. In this Section, this Article addresses the equivalency theorists’ claim that the U.S. must
accord identical rights to those within and without its borders. See infra notes 196–213 and
accompanying text.
196. ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). For more detailed explanation of this
and other textual arguments, see Margulies, supra note 8, at 2143; see also Marko Milanovic,
Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J.
81, 85 (2015) [hereinafter Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance]
(supporting extraterritorial application of the ICCPR); Marko Milanovic, From Compromise to
Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties, 8 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 411, 429 (2008) (same); Beth Van Schaack, The United States’ Position on the
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now Is the Time for Change, 90 INT’L
L. STUD. 20, 57–59 (2014) (same). See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss4/3

38

Margulies: Surveillance By Algorithm: The NSA, Computerized Intelligence Col

2016]

SURVEILLANCE BY ALGORITHM

1083

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires interpreting a treaty
“in accordance with the ordinary meaning . . . [of its] terms.”197 Under
the “ordinary” meaning of two conditions linked by the conjunctive
“and,” a state incurs a duty only when both conditions are met.198 In other
words, a state incurs obligations under the ICCPR only to individuals who
are both “within its territory” and “subject to its jurisdiction.” This
reading of the ICCPR’s language precludes extraterritorial application.
However, ordinary rules of textual interpretation provide reasons to
question the statist view.199 First, this reading makes the verb “respect”
redundant.200 Generally one assumes that the drafters of a treaty, statute,
or constitution did not intend mere surplusage or superfluity—each of the
words used should add something to the agreement’s meaning.201 The
statist position clashes with this interpretive rule. Consider that the term
“respect” commits a state to refrain from violations. The term “ensure,”
in contrast, entails both respect in this sense and affirmative duties to
guarantee rights against incursions by others. Since “ensure” is a far
broader term that already encompasses the narrower duty to “respect”
rights, expressly mentioning the duty to “respect” would be unnecessary
if the statist position is correct that a state is bound to ensure and respect
rights only for those individuals within its territory.
In contrast, the position that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially
dovetails with the rule against superfluity. On the reading supporting
extraterritorial application, a state must respect individual rights
regardless of the location of the individuals. However, the state
undertakes the larger and more complex obligation to ensure rights only
regarding those individuals who are both within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction.
Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court
abandoned the formalistic territorial approach). But see J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical
Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 464–65 (2006) (suggesting caution in
extraterritorial reading of the U.S. Constitution).
197. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
198. Margulies, supra note 8, at 2143. Satisfaction of either condition would trigger an
obligation if the treaty drafters had placed the subjunctive term “or” between the two conditions.
199. The textual arguments against the current U.S. reading were made most
comprehensively in a 2010 memorandum by then-U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Harold
Koh. See Harold Hongju Koh, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic Scope of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2 (Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Koh
Memorandum].
200. Id. at 9.
201. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 930, 934–35 (2013) (noting the canon’s importance for courts while reporting that
congressional drafters do not necessarily view the canon as central to their work, since legislators
prefer surplus language as a way of stressing substantive points).
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The U.S. position also violates the rules of grammar.202 Under the U.S.
view, a state party must “respect . . . to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights” listed in the treaty. 203 Consider
on the phrase, “respect… to all individuals.” That phrase entails an
ungrammatical mating of verb and preposition. In English and French
syntax, one does not “respect” rights “to” rights holders. Americans
might tolerate sloppy drafting in English, but the French would surely
insist on flawless French. Massaging the sense of the language could ease
the grammar problem. For example, one could respect rights “with
regard” to individuals. However, reading the ICCPR in that way adds two
words to Article 17. This seems incongruous for a textualist approach that
purports to rely on the literal language of the treaty. Textualist canons
exclude a reading that depends on adding words, just as they are skeptical
of treating some words in the text as superfluous.204 In sum, the statist
position is stuck with a choice of two alternatives that are both flawed
from a textualist perspective. Either the drafters used bad grammar, which
seems unthinkable for the French, or they inadvertently omitted two
words (“with regard”) from the provision’s text. Each assumption clashes
with a textualist reading.
A reading that requires a state to respect rights everywhere but ensure
rights only in a more limited area where it has greater control is also
consistent with the intent of the ICCPR’s drafters, as revealed in the
arguments made by U.S. Representative Eleanor Roosevelt. As Roosevelt
explained, the United States feared that a broad view of the agreement’s
territorial scope would require it to guarantee rights within each of the
defeated Axis powers that the United States and its allies occupied after
World War II.205 The early wording of Article 2 imposed on a signatory
state the duty to “guarantee to all persons residing on their territory and
within their jurisdiction the rights defined in the present covenant.”206
The term “guarantee” could have created a U.S. commitment to ensure
rights in the former Axis states. This commitment would have been
burdensome, impracticable, and arguably illegal under U.S. law.207 To
forestall this daunting prospect, Roosevelt told the drafting group that the
agreement’s language should clearly disavow any duty by states to
202. See Koh Memorandum, supra note 199, at 10.
203. Id. (quoting ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 2(1)).
204. See Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada, 30
OTTAWA L. REV. 175, 184 (1998–99) (observing that, “[f]or a true literalist, adding words to a
clear text is always unacceptable,” since it amounts to an “amendment” of the statute).
205. See U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 193d mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.193 (May 15,
1950).
206. See id. (emphasis added).
207. Margulies, supra note 8, at 2144–45.
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“ensure the rights recognized in [the covenant] to the citizens of countries
under United States occupation.”208 However, Roosevelt agreed that U.S.
forces, wherever in the world their mission placed them, had a duty to
respect rights under the ICCPR,209 since imposing a duty on the United
States to ensure its own troops’ compliance with the treaty was not
burdensome or unreasonable.
Finally, the statist view fails to account for the ICCPR’s logic and
purpose. The ICCPR, drafted by the United States and its World War II
allies shortly after the end of that decisive conflict, was a response to the
unspeakable persecution unleashed by Nazi Germany.210 On a statist
reading, however, the ICCPR would not bar a recurrence of the prime
symbol of Nazi human rights abuses: Auschwitz and the other
concentration camps.211 After all, these death camps were all located
outside German territory.212 A reading of a post-World War II human
rights treaty that would not prohibit a repeat of the death camps makes a
travesty of the ICCPR’s structure and purpose. As Chief Justice John
Roberts recently noted with respect to the Affordable Care Act, a
plausible interpretation should respect the purpose behind the drafting of
a text.213 Under that standard, the statist view of the ICCPR falls short.
V. A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO AUTOMATED SEARCHES ABROAD
Now having established the applicability of Article 17 of the ICCPR,
which bars “arbitrary” intrusions on privacy, this Article can address how
that standard affects a state’s overseas machine searches. This Part argues
that the international law concept of complementarity and the human
rights doctrine that accords states a “margin of appreciation”214 entitle
states to a measure of deference in the assessment of their overseas
surveillance policies. This measure of deference counters surveillance
critics’ third equivalency proposition: the claim that a state must provide
a person who is overseas and has no ties to that state precisely the same
208. U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., 194th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.194 (May 16, 1950)
(summarizing statements made by Eleanor Roosevelt regarding the adoption of an amendment to
the agreement).
209. Id. at 9.
210. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing
World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 A.J.S. 1373, 1373–74 (2005).
211. See Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance, supra note 196, at
108–11.
212. See Nazi Camps, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/e
n/article.php?ModuleId=10005144 (last updated Jan. 29, 2016).
213. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495–96 (2015) (underlining the need to appraise
the context and structure of statutes, while conceding, citing Justice Felix Frankfurter, that such
assessments are a “subtle business” (quoting Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83 (1939))).
214. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 47 (1976).
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privacy rights that the state provides to its citizens or other individuals
within its borders.215
Three crucial considerations buttress the case for deference. First,
overseas surveillance serves substantial international law interests,
permitting states to further the intent of U.N. Security Council
resolutions, such as Resolution 2178, which the Security Council recently
adopted to promote international cooperation against the threat posed by
foreign and returning fighters associated with ISIS and other terrorist
groups.216 Second, when used to identify, locate, and deter members of
groups such as ISIS engaged in an armed conflict with a state, overseas
surveillance is also consistent with the LOAC.217 Third, surveillance can
help states ease privacy threats from cyber criminals and foreign
nations.218
A. Deference, Human Rights, and Machine Access
The first touchstone of any review of state surveillance policies is the
measure of deference that states have received from transnational human
rights bodies such as the ECHR. This deference is sometimes couched in
terms of the complementarity that international tribunals allow to
individual state determinations219 or the “margin of appreciation” that
transnational human rights tribunals such as the ECHR show to individual
states on matters of security and public safety.220 Deference is rooted in
the structure and logic of international norms.
All international law depends on the cooperation of states.221 State
practice shapes customary international law. In addition, state consent is
required for the promulgation of treaties.222 Failing to allow a measure of
deference for state interpretation of treaty terms would discourage future
215. See, e.g., Emmerson, supra note 12, para. 43, at 16.
216. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 22, at 1–2.
217. Cf. Schmitt, supra note 25, at 596–97 (noting the importance of intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance in war-fighting).
218. See generally Pozen, supra note 24, at 229 (noting that with a reduction in surveillance,
“risk may be shifted not only among groups that suffer privacy harms but also among groups that
cause harm to a certain privacy interest—among privacy violators as well as victims”).
219. Samuel C. Birnbaum, Predictive Due Process and the International Criminal Court, 48
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 307, 337–39 (2015).
220. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 47 (1976); see also
Robert D. Sloane, Human Rights for Hedgehogs?: Global Value Pluralism, International Law,
and Some Reservations of the Fox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 975, 983 (2010) (noting that the ECHR allows
states “a ‘margin of appreciation’ within which to implement or interpret human rights in ways
that may be sensitive or responsive to prevailing social, cultural, and other norms within their
polities”).
221. See William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structural
Realignment and Substantive Pluralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 38 (2015).
222. See Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters––Non-State Actors, Treaties,
and the Changing Sources of International Law, BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 137, 144 (2005).
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treaties and encourage defection from treaty regimes.223 Moreover,
international law bodies have a competence deficit in dealing with the
special problems faced by individual states. Navigating the currents of
local custom and culture can be perilous. Lending a measure of deference
to state officials’ efforts ensures that officials with greater knowledge of
those institutional and cultural factors can take a first crack at the issue,
thereby reducing the mistakes made by transnational bodies lacking such
local knowledge.224
1. Deference and Harmonizing International Norms
One vital function of deference is giving states the space they need to
sort out tensions between disparate international law norms. A rigid
approach cannot reckon with the exigencies that shape the
implementation of norms. In contrast, granting states a measure of
deference can minimize norm conflicts.
Consider U.N. Security Council resolutions enacted after September
11 to address the threat of terrorism. For example, Security Council
Resolution 2178 addresses the burgeoning threat of ISIS.225 Resolution
2178 focuses on the threat of foreign fighters joining ISIS, acquiring safe
harbors in states that are unwilling or unable to combat the terrorist
group226 and then returning to their native countries in the West to engage
in violence. The Security Council warned specifically about the “increased
use by terrorists . . . of communications technology . . . including . . . the
internet” as a means of recruitment.227 To address this concern, the Security
Council highlighted the need for member states to cooperate in preventing
terrorists from “exploiting technology . . . [and] communications.”228
Carefully tailored overseas surveillance makes the Security Council’s
wishes an achievable blueprint, instead of an exercise in airy aspiration.
If machine learning can enhance the effectiveness of overseas
surveillance, it should be part of the equation. After all, terrorists readily
223. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International
Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1834 (2002) (raising the question of the point at which the “substantive
rules or review mechanism” become “too constraining” on states).
224. See Sloane, supra note 220, at 982–83; cf. Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact
Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1364–66 (2009) (analyzing factors influencing U.S. judicial
deference to executive decisions).
225. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 22, at 2; see also S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 23, at para.
3 (urging, in a resolution passed shortly after the September 11 attacks, that states share
“operational information . . . regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks”
and “use of communications technologies by terrorist groups”).
226. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 22, at 1.
227. Id. at 2.
228. Id. at 3, 7.
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cross borders, in both physical and virtual domains.229 Such groups are
not known for their acquiescence to Security Council resolutions.230 Nor
do they advertise their specific plans for violence. Indeed, a crucial aspect
of ISIS’s tactical advantage is the power of surprise it has gained through
its diffuse, decentralized operation.231
ISIS has also taken advantage of the weakness and chaos that has
afflicted states in the Middle East. A terrorist group that establishes a safe
haven in a state that is riven by armed conflict, such as Syria, Iraq, or
Yemen, can then mount or inspire operations in other states.232 Even
when those state targets of terror have functioning legal systems and
control over their own territory, they are unable to directly regulate
terrorist groups that have found safe havens in other countries.233
Cultivating informants and other sources of human intelligence is
difficult when a safe harbor state is unwilling or unable to cooperate with
the international community.234
Because an international framework is only as strong as its weakest
link, safe haven states can undermine global counterterrorism efforts. In
the face of terrorists’ opportunism in finding safe havens, a target state’s
ability to conduct surveillance abroad can help bridge the gap in
knowledge of terrorists groups’ structure, operations, and plans for future
violence.235 Surveillance that harnesses today’s technology, but does so
with appropriate constraints, can be an equalizer in the battle against ISIS
and other groups that practice violent extremism. A rigid definition of
international privacy norms that short-circuits this counterterrorism effort
would ultimately be self-defeating, leaving the initiative with forces like
229. See id. at 2.
230. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 30–31 (2010) (detailing terrorist
groups’ disregard for legal requirements).
231. See David Ignatius, How ISIS Spread in the Middle East and How to Stop It, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-startedsyria-iraq/412042/.
232. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 22, at 2.
233. See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 34 (upholding a material support statute
against First Amendment and vagueness challenges, and observing that deference was important
in national security and foreign relations cases because in those areas “information can be difficult
to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess”).
234. See generally Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2012) (describing the
elaborate test a victim state must evaluate before attacking a safe harbor state unable or unwilling
to take action against residing terrorists); cf. Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force Against Non-State
Actors: The State of Play, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 12–13 (2015) (explaining that the unable and
unwilling standard today applies broadly to non-state actors harbored in unwilling or unable
states).
235. Peter Margulies, Rage Against the Machine?: Automated Surveillance and Human
Rights 4 (Roger Williams U. L. Stud. Paper No. 164, 2015).
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ISIS that emphatically reject liberal norms such as privacy. In contrast, a
deferential approach would give states the flexibility they need to combat
violent extremism, while still demanding constraints that preserve
fundamental rights.
2. Surveillance and Armed Conflict
236

LOAC
also counsels for a measure of deference to states on
surveillance. Courts need to reconcile the foundational norms of human
rights law, including the bar on arbitrary deprivation of the right to life,
with the distinctive challenges posed by the existence of armed conflict,
including the privilege to use lethal force against other participants in the
conflict.237 LOAC provides more concrete guidance on these issues.
Consequently, LOAC’s provisions should inform but not displace human
rights law,238 including ICCPR Article 17’s prohibition on arbitrary
intrusions on privacy. While LOAC does not provide a blanket
justification for surveillance, overseas surveillance in the course of an
armed conflict has clear implications for LOAC that human rights law
should acknowledge.
In Hassan v. United Kingdom, the ECHR, addressing international
armed conflicts between states, strove to integrate LOAC and human
rights norms.239 Hassan addressed the issue of detention in Iraq.240 The
ECHR recognized that under human rights law, an individual has the right
to freedom from arbitrary deprivations of liberty.241 At the same time, the
236. For leading literature on international armed conflict law, see YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2d ed. 2010);
Michael N. Schmitt et al., The Manual on the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, INT’L
INST. HUMANITARIAN L. 1, 2, 8 (2006).
237. See Legality of the Threat Or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, ¶¶ 95–96 (July 8); Gerald L. Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 387 (2009) (endorsing “modifying the content of . . . treaty norms . . . by
importing relevant rules (if any exist) from the law of armed conflict”).
238. See Hassan v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 36 (2014). Historically, LOAC has
been viewed as lex specialis—as law that preempts other otherwise operative provisions of
international law. See Neuman, supra note 237, at 387. However, courts, including the ECHR in
Hassan, have aimed for a more tempered approach that reconciles LOAC and human rights norms
without the wholesale displacement of either corpus of law.
239. Hassan, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 104 (ruling that in an international armed conflict, human
rights norms “continue to apply, albeit interpreted against the background” of LOAC’s
provisions).
240. Id. at para. 3.
241. Id. at para. 7. The Hassan court interpreted the European Convention on Human Rights,
which in Article 5, Section 1 secures the right to “liberty and security of the person” and
enumerates specific exceptions, such as detention pending criminal trial or deportation. Id. at para.
96. These exceptions do not include detention during an armed conflict. Id. at paras. 96–97. The
Hassan court asserted that the “fundamental purpose of Article 5 § 1” of the European Convention
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court recognized that in armed conflict, a state had the legal right to detain
combatants whom it had captured to prevent them from reentering the
fray.242 Although detention under LOAC was not expressly enumerated
in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Hassan court
interpreted the Convention to accommodate this venerable aspect of
armed conflict.243
A similar analysis might govern surveillance. On the one hand,
reconnaissance and surveillance of another party to an armed conflict are
accepted incidents of war.244 The law of war does not preclude
espionage245 and permits a wide range of observation of enemy forces.
This observation can be clandestine or open. A non-international armed
conflict, such as the conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda and
associated forces, does not diminish a state’s prerogatives to engage in
such observation of its adversaries.246 A rigid application of the ICCPR
was “to protect the individual from arbitrariness.” Id. at para. 105.
242. Id. at para. 104.
243. Id.
244. See Schmitt, supra note 25, at 597. Even absent an armed conflict, surveillance of cyber
threats might be an appropriate countermeasure for a state injured by another state’s failure to
control cyber intrusions emanating from the second state’s territory. See Michael N. Schmitt,
“Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and
International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697, 705–07 (2014).
245. Jordan J. Paust, Can You Hear Me Now?: Private Communication, National Security,
and the Human Rights Disconnect, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 612, 647 (2015) (noting that “widely
practiced espionage regarding foreign state secrets is not a violation of international law”). The
International Court of Justice has issued preliminary relief barring one state from conducting
surveillance on officials of another state in peacetime. See Questions Relating to the Seizure and
Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), Provisional Measure, 2014
I.C.J. Rep. 147, ¶ 27 (Mar. 3). That decision turned on the integrity of arbitral proceedings
involving the two countries. See id. ¶ 42 (asserting that the right of a state to engage in arbitration
could “suffer irreparable harm” if the state conducting such surveillance used the information
acquired to gain an advantage).
246. Schmitt, supra note 25, at 597–98. One question remaining after the ECHR’s decision
in Hassan is the applicability of its holding to non-international armed conflicts between a state
and a non-state actor, such as Al Qaeda or ISIS. See generally Hakimi, supra note 234 (discussing
the state of the law on armed conflicts against non-state actors). Some language in Hassan
supports a narrow reading, which would limit authority to detain to traditional international armed
conflicts between states. See Hassan, Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 104 (noting that “[i]t can only be in
cases of international armed conflict, where the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of
civilians who pose a threat to security are accepted features . . . that Article 5 could be interpreted
as permitting the exercise of such broad powers”). If this narrow view is correct, in a noninternational armed conflict, a state would have to formally derogate from its duties under the
governing human rights treaty. This derogation would then be subject to proportionality review.
See A. and Others v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 14–17 (2009). This is the view taken
by an intermediate-level British court. See Mohammed v. Sec’y of State for Defence [2015]
EWCA
Civ.
843
[¶¶
242,
246]
(Eng.),
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/serdar-mohammed-v-ssd-yunus-rahmatullah-v-mod-and-fco.pdf.
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that precluded such observation would disrupt LOAC. On the other hand,
unchecked overseas surveillance in an armed conflict could lead to the
arbitrary intrusions on privacy that the ICCPR prohibits. Given this
tension, compliance with safeguards would permit tailored
reconnaissance and surveillance, while protecting rights.247
3. Overseas Machine Surveillance and Privacy Trade-Offs
Another reason to extend a measure of deference to states is the
presence of what Professor David Pozen has called privacy–privacy
trade-offs.248 Nationals of all states face privacy threats not only from
their own government, but also from other states and non-state actors.
While states wishing to conduct surveillance overseas cannot use this risk
as a blanket justification for any surveillance scheme, the need to conduct
surveillance to detect and monitor such privacy threats is an added
justification for granting states a quantum of discretion.
As an example, consider the view expressly held by the U.S.
government that China has been responsible for a wide range of cyber
intrusions in the United States.249 To facilitate these intrusions, Chinese
operatives may have sought to “spoof” other Internet Protocol addresses
based in other states or take over networks of computers in other
jurisdictions.250 While tradecraft of this kind can make it difficult to
A broader reading of Hassan would argue that the Court’s language was dicta because the
case concerned an international armed conflict. This view would stress the convergence of the
law regarding international and non-international armed conflicts and the functional case for
detaining participants in the latter situation to prevent them from engaging in further violence
during the pendency of the conflict. See id. ¶¶ 205–09, 235–40 (discussing commentary by
academics and legal advisers for the International Committee of the Red Cross). The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that the conflict with Al Qaeda is a non-international armed conflict, in
which both the power of states to detain and the safeguards accorded captives under Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions presumptively apply. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 630 (2006) (holding that conflict with Al Qaeda is “not of an international character” and is
therefore subject to the Geneva Conventions’ Common Article 3); cf. Geoffrey Corn & Eric
Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A “Principled” Approach to the Regulation of
Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISR. L. REV. 46, 66 (2009) (contending that the noninternational armed conflict designation model is most appropriate for purely internal rebellions
or civil wars and that conflict with transnational terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda or ISIS
requires a different model).
247. Cf. WITTES & BLUM, supra note 42, at 200–01 (conceding the risk that U.S. surveillance
could target disfavored groups but arguing that safeguards have vastly reduced this risk).
248. See Pozen, supra note 24, at 222.
249. Randal L. Gainer, DOD Adopts Interim Cyber Rules as Claims of Chinese Cyber Attacks
Continue, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/internati
onal-privacy-law/dod-adopts-interim-cyber-rules-as-claims-of-chinese-cyber-attacks-continue/.
250. See David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY
J. 531, 535 & n.5 (2011); Peter Margulies, Sovereignty and Cyber Attacks: Technology’s
Challenge to the Law of State Responsibility, 14 MELB. J. INT’L L. 496, 503 (2013).
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attribute responsibility for cyber intrusions, repeat players at such tasks
often use similar tactics over time. These techniques can reveal a
signature for the hackers, just as criminals in the analog world acquire a
modus operandi that brands their work.251 However, detecting such
tradecraft requires a certain level of surveillance. Machine surveillance
that looks for cyber signatures linked to past attacks can deter hackers
and provide useful information about cyber-criminals’ future plans. Even
when such intrusions cannot be stopped, the information acquired can
allow the government and prospective private victims of intrusions to
improve their resilience and minimize each intrusion’s impact. Individual
states can judge the need for surveillance to protect against cyber attacks
far more accurately than an international body handing down rigid rules.
4. Deference and Post-Snowden Privacy Decisions from European
Courts
Recent decisions by the CJEU and the ECHR may at first blush appear
to challenge the deferential approach. Both the CJEU’s decision in
Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner252 and the ECHR’s decision
in Zakharov v. Russia253 resulted in the invalidation of regimes that,
according to each court, failed to provide adequate safeguards for
privacy. Each decision is notable in its insistence that deference cannot
be absolute and that any program that authorizes or permits access to
personal information by intelligence agencies must have safeguards.
However, as this Article points out, Schrems dealt only with an important
but limited EU agreement on commercial data sharing, not with
individual EU states’ surveillance programs, which lie beyond the
CJEU’s jurisdiction. Zakharov struck down a surveillance program in
Vladimir Putin’s Russia that was so fundamentally out of step with the
rule of law that the case’s relevance is questionable for other states, such
as France and the United Kingdom, with more robust democratic
traditions and current systems of accountability.
a. Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner and the Need for a More
Privacy-Friendly Transatlantic Data-Sharing Agreement
In Schrems, the CJEU found that an agreement allowing EU firms to
share EU residents’ private data with U.S. firms lacked adequate privacy
protections.254 The Schrems decision invalidated the so-called “Safe
251. See SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 132 (discussing the attribution of responsibility for cyber
intrusions based on forensic analysis).
252. Case C-362/14, 2015 E.C.R.
253. Eur. Ct. H.R. paras. 147, 300–04 (2015).
254. Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-4. For commentary on Schrems, see Francesca Bignami
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Harbor” agreement, under which private firms in Europe could share
customer information with U.S. firms to facilitate transnational business
transactions.255 Under the Safe Harbor agreement, U.S. firms selfcertified that they had implemented privacy principles, and the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission’s Consumer Protection Bureau policed firms’
privacy practices.256 The Safe Harbor agreement also included a
conclusive presumption that data sharing pursuant to the agreement
complied with the privacy protections in Article 25 of the European
Charter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.257 This conclusive
presumption insulated Safe Harbor from privacy challenges mounted by
individual state data-protection authorities.
The Schrems case arose after Snowden’s revelations when
Maximilian Schrems, a law student and Austrian national who
maintained a Facebook account governed by a contract with Facebook
Ireland, took steps to prevent the transfer of his personal information to
the United States.258 Schrems asked Irish data-protection authorities to
stop the transfer of his data. Irish authorities refused, citing the Safe
Harbor’s presumption of compliance with EU law.259 The High Court of
Ireland affirmed the data commissioner’s decision.260 However, the High
Court was concerned that Safe Harbor might violate the European
Charter. Accordingly, the High Court referred the case to the CJEU.261
The CJEU struck down the conclusive presumption that data shared
under Safe Harbor received all of the protections required under EU law,
& Giorgio Resta, Transatlantic Privacy Regulation: Conflict and Cooperation 131–32 (George
Washington Univ. Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 2015-52, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705
601 (praising CJEU’s upholding of privacy principles); Scott J. Shackelford, Seeking a Safe
Harbor in a Widening Sea: Unpacking the EJC’s Schrems Decision and What It Means for
Transatlantic Relations, SETON HALL J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2680263 (critiquing the decision as failing to offer an accurate account
of U.S. intelligence collection); Peter Swire, US Surveillance Law, Safe Harbor, and Reforms
Since 2013, at 10–18 (Ga. Tech. Scheller Coll. of Bus., Research Paper No. 36),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2709619 (pointing out mischaracterizations of U.S. programs such as
Section 702 in an opinion on Safe Harbor by EU Advocate General Bot, which CJEU relied on in
its opinion).
255. Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-3, I-31.
256. Id. at I-9.
257. Id. at I-9 to -10.
258. Id. at I-19; Juliet Fioretti & Georgina Prodhan, Schrems: The Law Student Who Brought
down a Transatlantic Data Pact, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2015, 4:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/us-eu-ireland-privacy-schrems-idUSKCN0S02NY20151006; cf. Mieke Eoyang, Beyond
Privacy and Security: The Role of the Telecommunications Industry in Electronic Surveillance
11–12 (Hoover Inst. Essay Series Paper No. 1603, 2016) (Apr. 2016) (discussing EU indignation
about U.S. surveillance post-Snowden that led up to Schrems decision).
259. Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-19.
260. Id. at I-19 to -20.
261. Id. at I-21.
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holding that state data-protection authorities could challenge Safe Harbor
as not offering an “adequate level of protection” to individuals’ private
personal information under Article 25 of the European Charter.262 To
support its holding, the CJEU cited Snowden’s revelations, asserting that
Safe Harbor did not adequately protect individuals’ data from the full
extent of collection and surveillance by U.S. intelligence agencies. 263 In
particular, the CJEU noted that the Safe Harbor agreement did not include
a finding that U.S. intelligence agencies, in the course of pursuing
concededly “legitimate” objectives, such as national security, had
adopted rules to curb “interference” with the privacy rights of EU
citizens.264 The CJEU also cited concerns expressed by the European
Commission after the Snowden disclosures that U.S. access to “personal
data” exceeded what was “strictly necessary and proportionate” to fulfill
those legitimate national security objectives.265 Schrems has structural,
substantive, and procedural ramifications for any future EU–U.S. datasharing agreement.
i. Structure in Schrems
The CJEU’s decision creates significant collective action problems in
the EU by weakening the ability of the EU to agree to terms with the
United States on data sharing. Any agreement would have to contain
express acknowledgment that the U.S. government, including its security
agencies, had enacted safeguards on the use of EU subjects’ personal
data.266 Moreover, even if the agreement included a specific description
of U.S. government safeguards, Schrems seems to leave open the
possibility that EU member state data commissioners could challenge the
agreement as not providing protections that are “equivalent” to those that
the EU provides.267 Any U.S.–EU agreement would then be subject to a
holdout problem, since any single EU member state’s data privacy
authority could delay the agreement and ask that the CJEU invalidate it.
262. Id. at I-25.
263. Id. at I-31.
264. Id. at I-30.
265. Id. at I-31 to -32.
266. See infra notes 371–78 and accompanying text (discussing prospects for the U.S.
enactment of the Judicial Redress Act, which would provide EU residents with protections
extended to U.S. persons in the Privacy Act, such as recourse, with exceptions for national security
and law enforcement needs, against agencies that improperly collected, retained, or disseminated
personal information).
267. See Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-33. Ironically, because Safe Harbor provided for
review of U.S. participating firms’ privacy policies by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission,
difficulties in implementing a replacement for Safe Harbor may leave EU residents with fewer
privacy protections. See Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in EU Data Transfer Regulation
Post Schrems 11, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2732346.
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Imagine if the Framers of the U.S. Constitution had required a unanimous
vote from Congress to enact legislation. That chaotic situation was
exactly what the Framers wished to overcome when they drafted a
Constitution with a strong federal government and robust limits on
individual states’ power to engage in foreign affairs.268 Schrems appears
to invite comparable chaos.
On the structural front, bilateral agreements between states could
furnish a “fix” for Schrems. The CJEU interprets EU law, which
expressly disclaims authority over member states’ national security and
law enforcement legislation.269 This carve-out for individual states is part
of the bargain that created the European Union. As a consequence, the
United States or U.S. firms could reach bilateral agreements or conclude
contracts with each member state.270 The United States has engaged in a
similar bilateral strategy in dealing with the International Criminal Court
(ICC), concluding agreements with almost one hundred states that they
will not refer cases to the ICC involving U.S. personnel conducting
activities within those states’ borders.271 However, such agreements are
problematic in a number of respects.
First, bilateral agreements can be cumbersome to negotiate272 and may
not be fully binding,273 particularly if new revelations about U.S.
collection practices fuel claims that circumstances have arisen that were
not contemplated by the agreements’ drafters or included in the
agreements’ text. Second, even if the CJEU would not have jurisdiction
over any such agreements, the ECHR would have jurisdiction over claims
that the agreements violated the privacy protections in the European
268. James Madison had warned that the weak federal government of the Articles of
Confederation period allowed “any indiscreet member [state] to embroil the confederacy with
foreign nations”). See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 281 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke ed.,
1961).
269. See Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-10 to -12 (citing EU Data Protection Directive,
Preamble, 13th recital). “[A]ctivities [such as]… public safety, defence, State security
or . . . criminal laws fall outside the scope of [European] Community law . . . .” EU Data
Protection Directive, Preamble, 13th recital. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, O.J. (L 281) 2.
270. See Shackelford, supra note 254, at 4 (warning that absent reaching an agreement that
will satisfy all EU members and the CJEU, companies will have to resort to “expensive and timeconsuming model contracts or other agreements to continue transatlantic data transfers”).
271. Stuart W. Risch, Hostile Outsider or Influential Insider? The United States and the
International Criminal Court, 2009 ARMY LAWYER 61, 80–81 (2009) (noticing that “[t]hese
bilateral accords certify that neither signing state will arrest, extradite, or otherwise surrender the
other’s personnel to the Court”).
272. See Shackelford, supra note 254, at 4.
273. See Risch, supra note 271, at 82 (stating that “the Bilateral Immunity Agreements
(BIAs) do not bind the ICC in any way”).
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Convention on Human Rights.274 The ECHR might be skeptical of such
agreements, viewing them as an expedient rather than a principled
approach worthy of deference. Third, and relatedly, U.S. circumvention
of Schrems might ultimately lead to a diminution in America’s “soft
power”: its ability to persuade other nations of the rightness of its
positions through its leadership role.275 Fourth, political and legal
crosscurrents in various EU member states might make the conclusion of
such agreements difficult, recreating the holdout problem mentioned
above. For example, suppose all states agreed except for Germany. Given
Germany’s dominant position in Europe’s economy, a regime of bilateral
agreements that did not include Germany would hardly be worth the cost.
ii. Schrems and the Interplay of Substance and Procedure
Because the individual and bilateral fixes for Schrems involve
significant uncertainty, it is worthwhile to ponder Schrems’s substantive
and procedural lessons. The CJEU does not clearly separate its
substantive and procedural concerns. This Article does so here, with the
proviso that both Schrems’s posture and the decision’s lack of clear
separation between substantive and procedural aspects suggest flexibility
on the part of the Court that belies the strict privacy-protective rhetoric
of the decision.276
The posture of the Schrems decision leaves the door open to a more
flexible approach, since the decision addresses only the threshold
274. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8(1),
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention for the Protection of Human Rights]
(“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.”); id. art. 8(2) (“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
275. See Risch, supra note 271, at 66 (discussing how the United States’ bilateralist approach
to avoiding jurisdiction of ICC has been costly to America’s global reputation and to necessary
collaboration with other states); see also JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER
35 (2002) (arguing that a failure by the United States to build global consensus will result in the
loss of “important opportunities for cooperation in the solution of global problems such as
terrorism”); cf. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1480
(2003) (highlighting international perception that the United States believes that its global role
creates entitlement to exceptions from human rights and other norms).
276. See Bignami & Resta, supra note 254, at 129 (noting the Schrem court’s “hardening
stance on the right to personal data protection”); cf. Google Spain v. Spanish Data Prot. Agency
& Costeja, 2014 I.C.J. paras. 20, 99 (May 13) (finding a “right to be forgotten” based on EU
privacy guarantees that require internet search firms such as Google to heed requests to delete
irrelevant, outdated, and prejudicial material from searchable online data upon an application by
an aggrieved party).
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question of whether Safe Harbor could bar challenges by individual state
data-protection authorities. The CJEU held only that the Safe Harbor
agreement was invalid because it wrongly presumed U.S. compliance
with the European Charter and thus unlawfully precluded challenges by
individual EU state data-protection authorities. In the course of
supporting that holding, the CJEU engaged in a preliminary and
somewhat imprecise discussion of U.S. surveillance in the wake of
Snowden’s disclosures. However, the CJEU did not rule on any
substantive challenge brought by state data-protection authorities. No
such challenge was before the court. Instead, the CJEU merely indicated
that the Safe Harbor agreement did not provide sufficient safeguards to
preclude such a challenge. Viewed in this context, the CJEU’s substantive
discussion was at best support for a threshold finding that the agreement
lacked adequate assurances. A more comprehensive analysis by the court
of how U.S. intelligence collection—including post-Snowden
reforms277—meshed with EU law would have to await adjudication of a
challenge brought by state data-protection commissioners.278
Turning to the substance of EU privacy protections, the CJEU
suggested that U.S. government access to EU residents’ data had to be
“strictly necessary and proportionate” to the U.S. interest in national
security and law enforcement.279 Yet what this standard might mean in a
particular case, including Schrems itself, is not exactly clear from the
CJEU opinion. The court does not undertake a concrete analysis of major
U.S. collection and surveillance programs, including Section 702, EO
12,333, or the domestic collection of metadata. Indeed, the CJEU does
not even mention that Congress, in the USA Freedom Act, had enacted a
fundamental change in the metadata program as it was authorized prior
to Snowden’s disclosures, leaving data in private firms’ hands subject to
specific government requests that the FISC had to approve in advance.280
The CJEU also did not address the limits in Section 702 or those imposed
as part of the United States’ PPD-28 process.
Instead of engaging in a specific analysis of U.S. collection and
surveillance law, the court appeared to rely on concerns expressed by the
European Commission and a Working Group established by the
277. See Swire, supra note 254, at 10–21 (discussing how the media has misclassified U.S.
intelligence collection reforms under Section 702 and how they provide much more protection
and oversight than widely believed).
278. The CJEU could also consider an appeal by an individual from a decision by state
authorities finding as a substantive matter that the U.S. provided protections equivalent to those
in the EU.
279. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-31 to -32.
280. See Swire, supra note 254, at 26 (“This approach was codified in the USA Act, passed
in 2015, which also prohibited the bulk collection of telephone metadata and required the queries
to be submitted with court approval to the providers.”).
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Commission.281 However, the Commission documents predate passage
of the USA Freedom Act and the PPD-28 process.282 This makes for an
unfortunate gap in the court’s analysis.
Moreover, even insofar as the EU Commission documents referred to
in Schrems deal with pre-Snowden collection and surveillance, those
documents do not comprehensively address substantive limits that were
already in place. For example, the Commission documents crossreferenced in the Schrems decision highlight one issue under Section 702:
the statutory allowance for collection of information relating to the
“foreign affairs” of the United States.283 The Commission Working
Group, as well as privacy advocates on both sides of the Atlantic, viewed
this provision as permitting the broad-based collection of information on
any individual or entity, private or public, that in some attenuated way
affects U.S. foreign relations. Viewed in that light, of course, the “foreign
affairs” prong of Section 702 would render the other, more specific
provisions of the statute meaningless. However, both the provision’s text
and its apparent application suggest a far narrower meaning.
Section 702 allows collection of intelligence “with respect to a foreign
power or foreign territory” relating to the “the conduct of the foreign
affairs of the United States.”284 In U.S. intelligence law, the term “foreign
power” refers to a foreign government or a non-state entity such as Al
Qaeda or ISIS that holds itself out as fulfilling the functions of a state,
281. See Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-16 to -18.
282. Id. at I-17 (noting that EU Commission documents were issued on November 27, 2013,
before the announcement or implementation of U.S. reforms).
283. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B) (2012); see also Peter Margulies, Defining “Foreign Affairs”
in Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act: The Virtues and Deficits of Post-Snowden Dialogue
on U.S. Surveillance Policy, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1283, 1285 (2015) (“The ‘foreign affairs’
language . . . is not a residual clause authorizing all the collection and surveillance precluded by
other definitions in the statute. It simply allows the United States to gather information relating to
other states’ compliance with norms and the prospects for international cooperation on
enforcement.”). But see Claude Moraes (Rapporteur), Draft Report on the US NSA Surveillance
Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’
Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, 7–8, 11, E.N.
Doc. 2013/2188(INI) (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/jan/-draft-nsasurveillance-report.pdf (acknowledging analogous exceptions in a report issued before President
Obama’s speech in January 2014, but arguing that NSA surveillance could be “used for reasons
other than national security and the… fight against terrorism, for example economic and industrial
espionage or profiling on political grounds” and was not “necessary and proportionate” vis à vis
exceptions); Timothy Edgar, Focusing PRISM: An Answer to European Privacy Concerns?,
LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 2015), https://lawfareblog.com/focusing-prism-answer-european-privacyconcerns (arguing for narrowing Section 702); Elizabeth Goitein & Faiza Patel, What Went
Wrong with the FISA Court, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 27 (Mar. 18, 2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/what-went-wrong-fisa-court (critiquing Section 702
“foreign affairs” provision).
284. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B).
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including defense.285 Under established principles of construction, the
indefinite article “a” preceding “foreign power” also modifies “foreign
territory.” Bear in mind that courts generally disfavor superfluity in
statutory interpretation.286 If “foreign territory” had the capacious
meaning contemplated by privacy advocates, that broader definition
would render the preceding statutory term “foreign power” superfluous.
There would be no point in expressly authorizing collection “with respect
to a foreign power” if Congress had already authorized any collection that
happened to entail a person or entity located outside the United States. To
give the term “foreign power” any meaning under the statute, one must
also give the term “foreign territory” a more circumscribed meaning than
the catch-all connotation that privacy advocates fear.
Viewed in this light, Section 702’s authorization of collection
regarding a “foreign territory” contemplates two narrowly circumscribed
situations. The first connotes a specific unit of land that a foreign power
has annexed, as Puerto Rico is a territory of the United States. The second
use of “territory” entails a specific area that is legally under the sovereign
jurisdiction of a foreign power, but as a practical matter that power does
not control it (this might describe certain activities within “failed” or
“failing” states such as Yemen). Each version or a combination of both
ensures some independent meaning for both “foreign power” and
“foreign territory,” and therefore complies with the canon disfavoring
superfluity.
In practice, moreover, the U.S. interpretation of “foreign affairs”
includes a more circumscribed definition focusing on foreign
governments: activities regarding international agreements, including
bribery, collusion, and even the formation of negotiating positions on
matters such as sanctions for state sponsors of terrorism.287 While this
information is sensitive, its collection is consistent with longtime
international understandings that espionage is not a violation of
international law.288
285. Id. § 1801(a) (describing “foreign power” as a “foreign government,” a “faction of a
foreign nation or nations,” an “entity . . . openly acknowledged by a foreign government . . . to be
directed and controlled by” a foreign government or governments, or a terrorist group, “foreignbased political organization,” an entity “directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments,” or an entity “engaged in the international proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction”).
286. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 201, at 934–35 (noting that “the political interests
of the audience often demand redundancy”); supra notes 199–204 and accompanying text
(discussing avoiding superfluity in interpreting ICCPR).
287. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Book Reveals Wider Net of U.S. Spying on Envoys, N.Y.
TIMES (May 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/13/world/middleeast/book-revealswider-net-of-us-spying-on-envoys.html (discussing the NSA’s role in the diplomatic negotiations
leading up to Iran sanctions).
288. See Paust, supra note 245, at 647 (“Also complicating rational and policy-serving
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However, to stem the European concern voiced in Schrems, Congress
and the Executive Branch should consider either amending the “foreign
affairs” prong to promote greater clarity and specificity or conveying an
executive branch interpretation in public or private that would vindicate
these goals. For example, administration officials could assure their EU
counterparts that Section 702 would not permit spying on individual EU
residents for purposes that would be barred under EO 12,333, such as
suppressing speech critical of the United States; discriminating against
racial, religious, or ethnic groups; or gaining a competitive advantage for
U.S. companies.289 These assurances might allay the fears expressed in
Schrems. Such an effort would be worthwhile as part of the overall
process of enhancing transparency that is key to PPD-28.
On the question addressed in this Article—the legality of machine (as
opposed to human) access to data—Schrems is ambiguous. On the one
hand, the court seemed most concerned with the “storage” of data, not
with a computer’s scanning of such information.290 Ironically, however,
given the court’s taking the United States to task for its purported failure
to limit surveillance, the court’s own description of U.S. programs takes
a shotgun approach. That approach breeds uncertainty about the true
scope of the CJEU’s critique. The CJEU’s broad characterization of U.S.
intelligence efforts does not fit U.S. intelligence agencies’ relatively
limited storage of transnational communications under Section 702 but
may be more accurate as a description of U.S. machine scanning.
For example, the Schrems court asserted that U.S. intelligence
collection entailed
storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose data
has been transferred from the European Union to the United
States without any differentiation, limitation or exception
being made in the light of the objective pursued and without
an objective criterion being laid down by which to determine
the limits of the access of the public authorities.291
This harsh indictment does not resemble the Section 702 Upstream
program. Upstream scans a wide range of transatlantic communications
as they pass through buffers or caches in communications hubs.292
Nevertheless, Upstream entails storage of only a limited number of
choice is the widespread recognition that espionage engaged in by a state within a foreign state
can violate the latter’s domestic law, but widely practiced espionage regarding foreign state
secrets is not a violation of international law.”).
289. See PPD-28, supra note 27, at 3–6.
290. See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-32.
291. Id.
292. See Swire, supra note 254, at 18.
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communications that are to, from, or about particular selectors linked to
Section 702 categories, such as terrorism, espionage, and the limited
“foreign affairs” prong discussed above.293 Perhaps the CJEU viewed
scanning and storage as identical intrusions on privacy. However, a court
drawing that conclusion should have justified its equation of scanning
and storage, which engender disparate risks of human overreaching.
Finally, Schrems has a procedural component that builds on the
CJEU’s prior decision in Digital Rights Ireland.294 Procedurally, Schrems
calls for two attributes discussed in the normative section of this piece:
independent review of surveillance policies and recourse for those
victimized by such policies. As the CJEU noted, “The very existence of
effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with provisions
of EU law is inherent in the existence of the rule of law.”295 To be
effective, the reviewing body must be independent of the agencies whose
policies it purports to review. Moreover, each individual should have the
right of “access to personal data relating to him” and the right “to obtain
the rectification or erasure of such data.”296 In other words, an individual
should have a remedy when a government has collected, stored, or
disseminated that individual’s data wrongfully.
Schrems’s emphasis on procedure suggests that there may be a sliding
scale with respect to the relationship between substantive and procedural
rights and some flexibility within the category of procedural rights.297
The Schrems court might in future cases tolerate more substantive
flexibility for U.S. intelligence collection on EU residents in exchange
for tighter procedural safeguards. The prospect of independent review,
even on a more relaxed substantive standard, would discipline U.S.
intelligence agencies, reducing the prospect of egregious intrusions on
privacy. The salutary discipline provided by procedural safeguards might
assure the CJEU that the rule of law would be observed, permitting a
more relaxed reading of the substantive strict-necessity standard. Broader
machine collection accompanied by robust restrictions on analysts’
access to and use of data might pass muster. That trade-off might actually
work better than insisting on a specific level of both substantive and
293. See id. at 22 (explaining that the “total number of individuals targeted under Section
702 in 2013 was 92,707, a tiny fraction of total EU or global Internet users”).
294. Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Comm’r, 2014 E.C.R.
295. Case C-362/14, Schrems, at I-33.
296. Id.
297. In a familiar example of a sliding scale, courts trade off the irreparability of harm,
balance of hardships between the parties, and probability of success on the merits in considering
whether to grant a preliminary injunction. See Dataphase Sys. v. CL Sys., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th
Cir. 1981); Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485,
487 (2010) (discussing the balance of equities test); cf. MATTHEW BENDER, 13 MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 65.22(5)(b)–(i) (2015) (analyzing tests in different federal appellate tribunals).
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procedural safeguards. Moreover, independence in review mechanisms
could be subject to a sliding scale. Administrative, as opposed to judicial
review, would be appropriate if the administrative review came with
appropriate guarantees of independence, the power to obtain necessary
information from intelligence agencies in the course of providing
oversight, and the authority to provide necessary relief to enforce
compliance with legal requirements.298
In February, 2016, the EU and the United States announced a new
proposed data-sharing agreement, Privacy Shield, with greater clarity on
U.S. substantive and procedural protections of personal data.299 In the
new agreement, the U.S. pledged to create an Office of the
Ombudsperson in the State Department to respond to EU complaints
about data privacy.300 As a State Department official, the proposed
ombudsperson would be officially separated from intelligence agencies
in other U.S. cabinet departments. That separation is an encouraging sign
in establishing the independence that Schrems mandated. However, like
all State Department officials, the ombudsperson would serve at the
pleasure of the President. Moreover, the February, 2016 proposal was
vague about the precise powers of the ombudsperson, including her
access to U.S. intelligence data.301 Clear description of such powers
would be a threshold condition for Privacy Shield’s compliance with
Schrems.302
b. Zakharov v. Russia: Putin as the Elephant in the Room
The ECHR’s decision in Zakharov v. Russia, unlike Schrems, deals
directly with the national security and law enforcement regimes of a
particular state.303 The ECHR in Zakharov reiterated its overarching view
298. See Zakharov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 147 (2015) (noting that under CJEU case
law review can be by either a “court or by an independent administrative body”).
299. See EC Adequacy Decision, supra note 35; Letter from Robert S. Litt, Gen’l Counsel,
Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to Justin S. Antonipillai, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce and Ted
Dean, Dep. Ass’t Sec’y, Int’l Trade Admin. (Feb. 22, 2016) (hereinafter ODNI Letter), http://ec.e
uropa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/privacy-shield-adequacy-decision-annex-6_en.pdf.
300. See EC Adequacy Decision, supra note 36, at 26.
301. This vagueness spurred criticism of the proposed Privacy Shield agreement by EU data
protection officials. See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, Opinion 01/2016 on the
EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Draft Adequacy Decision (Apr. 13, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2016/wp238_en.pdf.
302. Both the ECHR and the CJEU have found in a different context—the fairness of
procedures for designating individuals as terrorist financiers and blocking their assets—that an
ombudsperson is not a substitute for more formal judicial review. See Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland,
(Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 2016); Kadi v. Eur. Comm’n (European Court of Justice 2013).
303. See Zakharov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 1, 3 (2015) (“The applicant alleged that
the system of secret interception of mobile telephone communications in Russia violated his right
to respect for his private life and correspondence and that he did not have any effective remedy in
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that states are entitled to a “margin of appreciation” from the courts on
the validity of national security surveillance.304 In finding that Russia’s
provisions for domestic surveillance did not comply with Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, the ECHR relied on factors that
are specific to Vladimir Putin’s Russia.305 Although some have read
Zakharov as having broader implications,306 the court’s holding flows
largely from glaring flaws in the Russian framework for review of
domestic surveillance requests.
The Russian framework found wanting in Zakharov combined a
robust capacity on the part of Russian authorities to access virtually all
domestic telecommunications data307 with very weak oversight of how
law enforcement exercised that capacity. As the court noted, the Russian
statute expressly bars a court considering surveillance requests from
asking law enforcement authorities for information about undercover
operatives or police informants or about how authorities will execute a
particular search.308 These limits on independent oversight effectively
made a law enforcement agency the judge of its own case. Deprived of
the power to seek information about the reliability of informants or the
actual conduct of a proposed search, the reviewing court lacked
“sufficient factual basis” for effective oversight.309 Moreover, although
the ECHR noted that the Russian Constitutional Court had held that a
reviewing court must find at least a “reasonable suspicion” that a criminal
offense has been committed,310 Russian law and practice did not require
that courts of general jurisdiction follow this decision.311

that respect.”).
304. Id. at para. 232.
305. Id. at paras. 302–05 (“It is significant that the shortcomings in the legal framework as
identified above appear to have an impact on the actual operation of the system of secret
surveillance which exists in Russia.”). Shortly after Zakharov, the ECHR reached a similar
decision regarding surveillance in Hungary, a former Iron Curtain state with a legal system that
suffers from fundamental flaws comparable to Russia’s. See Szabo v. Hungary, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2016).
306. See Carly Nyst, European Human Rights Court Deals a Heavy Blow to the Lawfulness
of Bulk Surveillance, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 9, 2015, 11:15 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/282
16/echr-deals-heavy-blow-lawfulness-bulk-surveillance/ (suggesting parallels between Russian
and United Kingdom surveillance programs); Lorna Woods, Zakharov v. Russia: Mass
Surveillance and the European Court of Human Rights, EU L. ANALYSIS (Dec. 16, 2015), http://e
ulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2015/12/zakharov-v-russia-mass-surveillance-and.html (same).
307. Zakharov, at paras. 111, 116 (discussing “remote-control” access to data by law
enforcement agencies).
308. Id. at paras. 37, 261.
309. Id. at para. 261.
310. Id. at para. 262.
311. Id. at para. 263.
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The ECHR found that the actual practice of Russian courts entailed
merely pro forma review.312 The ECHR noted that law enforcement
agency requests routinely lacked any supporting materials, that courts
“never” requested such materials, and that a mere passing “reference” to
national security justifying a search was usually enough to grant a law
enforcement agency’s request.313 Moreover, law enforcement authorities
were not required to show the pro forma approval to telecommunications
providers before conducting surveillance.314 This Potemkin village
version of oversight, according to the ECHR, all too predictably led to
rampant “arbitrary and abusive surveillance practices.”315 The Russian
judge on the ECHR, Judge Dmitry Dedov, concurred in the majority’s
assessment, observing that a “widespread suspicion” is prevalent among
Russia’s population that surveillance extends to “human-rights activists,
opposition activists and leaders, journalists,” and all others “involved in
public affairs.”316
This focus on the special problems posed by Putin’s despotic security
apparatus limits Zakharov’s utility as a template for analysis of
surveillance systems in European democracies. However, insistence on
crucial safeguards such as independent review will likely figure in those
future decisions.
B. Deferential Proportionality and Article 17 of the ICCPR
To fashion a standard for assessing a state’s machine surveillance, one
can combine arguments for reasonable, but not absolute, deference to
Article 17’s language, which bars “arbitrary” intrusions on privacy.317
Some form of proportionality review is common in international and
human rights cases and may also apply in the case of Article 17. 318 The
312. The ECHR made these findings without expressly mentioning the elephant in the room:
Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose commitment to legal niceties such as the separation of
powers is open to question. However, that unspoken presence is an important element of
Zakharov’s context. That element is absent in pending surveillance cases involving the United
Kingdom or other states, whatever the excesses.
313. Zakharov, at para. 263.
314. Id. at para. 269.
315. Id. at para. 303.
316. Id. at pt. 4 (Dedov, J., concurring).
317. See CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 (Right to Privacy), U.N. Human Rts.
Comm., The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of
Honour and Reputation, 32d Sess., para. 1 (Apr. 8, 1988).
318. The Human Rights Committee, which is designated by the United Nations to receive
reports from member states on compliance with the ICCPR, has recently advised the United States
that intrusions on privacy are subject to “the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity.”
ICCPR, supra note 7, at 10; cf. Emmerson, supra note 12, at 16 & n.34 (discussing
proportionality). To comply with the legality requirement, states must provide individuals with
some level of guidance about the state’s surveillance practices, although states need not provide
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applicable level of proportionality review should be flexible while
remaining cognizant of core privacy protections.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, commonly
understood meanings of the term “arbitrary” should inform the type of
proportionality review applied.319 Dictionaries define the term “arbitrary”
as referring to an action or decision that is “capricious, unreasonable, [or]
unsupported.”320 While this definition does not preclude application of a
proportionality standard, it suggests that the standard applied must be
capacious enough to uphold a range of reasonable state decisions.321
A deferential account of proportionality would be consistent with
Article 17’s arbitrariness standard and with the reasons for deference
outlined above.322 For an example of a deferential application of
proportionality, consider the ECHR’s decision in Zana v. Turkey323
interpreting the European Convention’s free speech provision, Article
10.324 Article 10 expressly permits content-related curbs on free speech
when those are necessary to protect national security and public safety.325
The court upheld the criminal conviction of a public official who had
described the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish insurgent
group, as “legitimate”—Turkey and other states, including the United
States, designate the PKK as a terrorist organization.326 The ECHR cited
“serious disturbances” relating to Kurdish insurgency in Turkey.327
Moreover, the court interpreted necessity in a relaxed fashion. Even
notice that will allow targets of surveillance to “adapt” their behavior and thereby frustrate state
efforts. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 152 (2010).
319. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
320. See David Sloss, Using International Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 1,
18 n.76 (2006).
321. Cf. Paust, supra note 245, at 633–34 (viewing proportionality as reasonable balancing
of rights and “just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society” (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at art. 1 (1948))).
322. For an example of such a standard, see Martin Lutern, The Lost Meaning of
Proportionality, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION,
REASONING 21, 34 & n.39 (Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller & Gregoire Webber eds., 2014)
(discussing the need for the ECHR to show deference in terrorism-related cases brought under the
European Convention on Human Rights to minimize future violations of human rights by nonstate actors; the European Convention, tellingly, does not expressly include the ICCPR’s
arbitrariness language but, according to the author, should nonetheless be read as incorporating a
relaxed proportionality standard); cf. id. at 35 (noting the frequency of cases that hinge on “many
subjective features of particular states and societies, of which a reviewing court (especially an
international court) will have no significant knowledge”).
323. 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 667 (1997).
324. Id. at 678–81.
325. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 274, at 11.
326. Zana, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 667–68, 679.
327. Id. at 688.
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though the official’s statement in support of the PKK was ambiguous,
since the official opposed the targeting of civilians, the court viewed his
conviction as “necessary” to deal with the “pressing social need.”328
Citing the margin of appreciation, the EHCR held that preventing speech
favorable to terrorist groups was “proportionate” to legitimate state
aims.329 The ECHR arrived at this conclusion despite the absence of
evidence that the speech at issue caused any concrete violence. 330 A
similar standard should apply to overseas machine surveillance.
C. Applying the Deferential Proportionality Standard
Even a relaxed proportionality standard should have some bite.
Absolute deference would provide no check on the false positives that
rightly worry privacy advocates. To address this concern, machine
surveillance should be tailored to compelling state purposes,
scientifically validated, and subject to independent review. This Section
discusses each safeguard in turn.
1. The Purpose of Machine Surveillance
A deferential proportionality inquiry on machine surveillance would
regard national security as an adequate justification. This would include
machine surveillance for the purposes listed in PPD-28: counterterrorism,
counterespionage, antiproliferation of WMDs, cybersecurity,
international crime, and sanctions evasion.331 Moreover, a deferential
proportionality standard would reject the equivalency thesis’s conflation
of a state’s own nationals (or others within its borders) with persons
abroad. Instead, a deferential reading of proportionality would credit a
state’s need to engage in surveillance abroad,332 particularly given the
328. Id. at 690–91.
329. Id. at 691.
330. In citing Zana, this Article in no way suggests that the United States should secondguess the more robust protections built into the First Amendment. See Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39 (2010) (holding that Congress could prohibit speech directed by or
coordinated with foreign terrorist groups, but observing that the First Amendment protects speech
involving domestic groups as well as speech that is independent of foreign terrorist organizations).
The Article’s sole point is to illustrate how the ECHR has applied a deferential proportionality
standard.
331. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 159 (2010) (accepting
“national security” as an adequate justification for surveillance and noting that requiring more
specific justification might impair states’ efforts to safeguard national security). But see Frank La
Rue (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶ 53–54, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17,
2013) (cautioning about unduly broad use of national security as justification for surveillance);
Emmerson, supra note 12, ¶¶ 11–13 (same).
332. See Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 84.
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difficulties of tracking overseas threats and the risk that terrorists will find
safe havens in other countries. The ECHR case law also suggests that
machine access to a substantial database of communications content may
be appropriate as long as human access is restricted.333 This principle
would cover directed searches tailored to terrorism and autonomous
searches based on data sets dealing with terrorism as long as those
searches were properly validated.
However, a state could not engage in untrammeled bulk collection of
content, even if human access were limited. Such untrammeled collection
would be problematic under both the deontological and consequential
branches of the first equivalency thesis. In a deontological sense,
unfettered machine searches would undermine the perception of control
that persons abroad have a right to expect. On a consequential level,
unbridled access could cause harm given the amount of incorrect
information in searched databases and human analysts’ unawareness of
or indifference to this problem.334
In an effort to accommodate LOAC, states would be allowed to use
machine searches in other countries that are the site of an armed conflict
involving the state conducting surveillance. That would authorize the
United States to engage in bulk collection of content throughout
Afghanistan. In countries without an armed conflict, a state would only
be able to engage in more tailored bulk collection of content linked to a
particular geographic area within that country where evidence indicated
a substantial terrorist presence and where more targeted techniques
indicated a spike in terrorist activity. In the Bahamas, for example, the
United States could target drug or human traffickers, but it could not
collect in bulk all other Bahamian communications content. Complying
with this standard would represent a change from current reported U.S.
policy. However, that change would be worthwhile in confirming the
United States’ devotion to constraints mandated by international human
rights.
2. Reliability
A valid purpose for a search is of little help if the search is unreliable.
Searches that are unreliable will yield too many false positives and thus
intrude unduly on innocent individuals. Validation is necessary to avoid

333. See id. at para. 32 (noting that German authorities used keywords to search
communications content).
334. See Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1152 (D. Or. 2014) (discussing “a 2009 report
by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General that concluded that the TSDB
contains many errors and that the TSC has failed to take adequate steps to remove or to modify
records in a timely manner even when necessary”).
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this risk.335 However, criteria for the reliability of machine searches
should respect the transparency paradox, which holds that transparency
in substantive explanations reduces the accuracy of the search.
Since autonomous search strategies such as neural networks or
support vector machines use hidden layers to boost accuracy,336 requiring
a substantive explanation would entail foregoing the accuracy that hidden
layers produce. That is a bad bargain. Instead of requiring analysts to
dumb down searches, human rights law should permit analysts to offer a
methodological explanation of their chosen search strategy. In other
words, officials can justify their search by explaining the technical basis
for the search and the criteria analysts have employed to validate the
search technique. One could argue that a substantive, verbal test is
important for other reasons: it requires officials to explain and justify
their decisions, permits easy review of search criteria, and offers guidance
for the public. In the domestic realm, parting with these attributes would
be unwise and illegal. However, pivoting to a methodological explanation
for overseas collection does not clash with the U.S. Constitution or
human rights norms. Indeed, by promoting more accurate searches,
permitting methodological explanations ensures that searches will be less
arbitrary. At least in the overseas realm, that trade-off is worthwhile.337
The methodology used in the search requires validation. A search
should yield more true positives (needles spotted in the haystack) than
alternative methods, while limiting the number of false positives
(handfuls of hay). In the national security surveillance context, the stakes
are higher: false negatives that should have been spotted are terrorists
who can commit acts of violence, while false positives who were
mistakenly tracked do not merely promote inefficiency but constitute
intrusions on individual privacy. Statisticians have developed a wealth of
indicia to assess the accuracy of a search.338 Four of these are precision
(the number of true positives among the number of predicted positives);
recall (the number of true positives identified as such by the search
compared with the number of actual positives, including those not
335. See Hu, supra note 143, at 808–16 (discussing the Daubert standard).
336. See supra Subsection I.C.2.a.ii.
337. Granting states the flexibility to use methodological, not substantive, explanations for
overseas computer searches is consistent with what Professor Paul Berman has called global legal
pluralism. For more detail on global legal pluralism, see generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL
LEGAL P LURALISM (2012) (examining the difficulties of a legal pluralistic world where multiple
legal regimes imposed by state, sub-state, transnational, supranational, and non-state communities
may regulate one person); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155
(2007) (recognizing that the existence of multiple, overlapping legal regimes causes conflict but
arguing that this conflict can be beneficial to produce alternative ideas and provide a forum for
communication among multiple communities).
338. See FLACH, supra note 80, at 56; WITTEN, supra note 1, at 174–77 (discussing various
methods used to evaluate false positive versus false negative trade-off).
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identified); the false negative rate for positives (the number of false
negatives as a proportion of the total number of actual positives); and the
false positive rate for negatives (the “false alarm” rate—the number of
false positives as a proportion of the total number of actual negatives).
Statisticians can plot these criteria against each other for a more refined
assessment.
To illustrate precision and recall, consider a stylized example.
Suppose software engineers have developed a program for recognizing
celebrities on the streets of New York. Analysts test the program on a day
in which an inordinate number of celebrities are present, such as Saturday
Night Live’s fortieth-anniversary bash. A video of Fifth Avenue includes
nine actual celebrities, such as Beyoncé, Jay Z, and Kim Kardashian,
along with dozens of anonymous pedestrians. The program identifies
seven celebrities. Four of the identifications are correct, but three of the
persons labeled as celebrities are actually random passers-by. The
program’s precision is 4/7, while its recall is 4/9.
This example highlights a challenge noted previously for machine
searches for terrorists, as opposed to celebrities: the availability of
adequate data. The celebrities are already identified. There may be
questions at the margins, such as people who used to be celebrities but
are now forgotten, or people who may be celebrities tomorrow but are
still part of the pack today. At the core, however, good data exists, based
on web searches, social media mentions, and the like. On the other hand,
ISIS recruits cannot necessarily be individually identified; if they could,
counterterrorism would be easier than it is. Indeed, identifying previously
unknown terrorists is a prime purpose of machine searches. That creates
a problem, at least for the recall criterion, which requires knowledge of
the number of actual positives in the relevant statistical universe.339 So
the lack of data, which is a problem for the efficacy of a national security
machine search in the first instance is also a problem in assessing the
efficacy of the search.
Analysts can work around this obstacle by comparing machine
searches to each other and to other search methods, using measures such
as the false negative rate for positives and the false positive rate for
negatives (the “false alarm” rate). For example, analysts could calculate
such rates for a search based only on human intelligence sources, such as
informants. Analysts could do similar calculations for the results of
directed searches that used identifiers such as phone numbers to trace the
contacts of suspected terrorists. Finally, analysts could compare the
results for autonomous searches using hidden layers in a neural network.

339. See WITTEN, supra note 1, at 175.
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False positives are likely to occur in human intelligence and in both
types of machine searches. The human intelligence search relies on
informants, who often have agendas of their own that can compromise
accuracy.340 For their part, directed searches include all contacts of
suspected terrorists and sometimes (as in the Patriot Act domestic
metadata program) include more “hops” (the contacts of the terrorists’
contacts, once or twice removed).341 False positives are certain here:
suspected terrorists may talk to lawyers, journalists, and dry-cleaners, as
well as other terrorists, and the terrorists’ contacts (and the contacts of
their contacts) may talk to even more innocent parties. Because of the
difficulty of getting data to fuel autonomous searches, false positives are
certain here as well. Nevertheless, an autonomous search might result in
fewer false positives than other approaches.
Settling on one formula for validation would undermine the deference
owed to the state conducting surveillance. Nevertheless, a couple of
observations are in order. As a general matter, each search in the order
listed (human, directed, and autonomous) should have a successively
higher cumulative recall rate. In other words, a directed search should
uncover actual positives missed by human intelligence, and an
autonomous search should reveal actual positives missed in the sum of
the first two searches. At the same time, the false positive rate for
negatives (the “false alarm” rate: false positives as a proportion of total
actual negatives) should remain within two standard deviations of the
previous search for each successive search. Again, this approach is not
the only appropriate validation strategy, but it suggests an overall
approach that would comply with human rights norms.
3. Review
Another cornerstone in the human rights architecture of surveillance is
review by an independent body. Review includes several elements,
including independence, notice to those potentially affected by
surveillance, rules regarding retention of irrelevant information, and
redress for those whose information was collected or retained arbitrarily.
This Article addresses each in turn.
a. Independence
The biggest post-Snowden development in human rights law
regarding surveillance has been the CJEU’s insistence on independent
340. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 937 n.89 (1999) (“Most prosecutors
distinguish informants from cooperators and believe that informants have even greater incentives
to lie than cooperators because, not only are they ‘working off’ cases, but their entire livelihood
is dependent on the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).”).
341. See Kris, supra note 51, at 219 (explaining “hops”).
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review of data retention and access in Schrems and Digital Rights
Ireland.342 The CJEU did not specifically address national security
surveillance, ruling only that the comprehensive EU data retention regime
violated fundamental rights.343 However, in its ruling, the court
highlighted the importance of independent review.344 Indeed, the CJEU
found that “automatic processing” of data created an additional risk of
abuse in the absence of independently enforced safeguards on access to
the information retained.345 This emphasis on independent scrutiny has
featured prominently in European human rights cases. In Kennedy v.
United Kingdom,346 the ECHR noted that the United Kingdom had
established an Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), which the ruling
party protects from interference.347 In Weber v. Germany, the ECHR
noted that Germany relies on an independent agency, the G10, to review
surveillance.348
The United States provides for independent judicial review of most
domestic law enforcement searches and has done so since the
Constitution’s enactment, but that framework has two gaps, one serious
and one bridgeable. The bridgeable gap is the absence of prior review
342. Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r, 2015 E.C.R. I-22 (“The establishment
in Member States of independent supervisory authorities is . . . an essential component of the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.” (internal citations
omitted)); Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Comm’r, 2014 E.C.R
para. 62 (disapproving of Directive 2006/24 because “access by the competent national authorities
to the data retained is not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an
independent administrative body”).
343. See Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, 2014 E.C.R. at para.
34.
344. See id. at 62 (stressing the need to provide for “prior review” by a court or an
“independent administrative body”).
345. See id. at paras. 54–55. Other cases in European national courts have followed the
CJEU’s lead. See Davis v. Home Sec’y, No. CO/3365/2014, [2015] EWHC (Admin) 2092 [para.
91(c)] (Royal Ct. of Justice London Div. 2015); see also Case C-362/14, Schrems, 2015 E.C.R.
at I-32 (citing DRI in observing that EU–U.S. Safe Harbor regime, which allows corporations on
both sides of the Atlantic to self-certify that they are observing privacy rules, is problematic in
light of revelations about U.S. surveillance); cf. id. at I-28 (finding a lack of authority to invalidate
the Safe Harbor program and referring the matter to CJEU); Nikolaj Nielsen, French Court Backs
Mass Surveillance, EUROBSERVER (July 24, 2015, 9:26 AM), https://euobserver.com/justice/1297
60 (reporting on the French decision); Sam Schechner & Matthew Dalton, French Constituonal
Court Approves New Powers for Intelligence Services, WALL STREET J. (July 24, 2015, 5:40 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/french-constitutional-court-approves-new-powers-for-intelligence-s
ervices-1437730809 (discussing France’s constitutional court decision that allows intelligence
services broad powers to spy).
346. 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4 (2010).
347. Id. at para. 232. A UK bill pending as of January 6, 2016, added a layer of judicial
review. See Shaheed Fatima, The “Snooper’s Charter” and Judicial Oversight, JUST SECURITY
(Dec. 21, 2015, 9:40 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/28443/snoopers-charter-judicialoversight/.
348. Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 25. The G10 has a mixed membership,
including a former judge and members of Parliament. Id.
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under Section 702, which concerns targeted surveillance. The FISC
reviews certifications from the Executive Branch under Section 702 but
does not approve particular selectors in advance of their use.349 On
balance, this is not a fatal flaw from a human rights perspective. A
number of ECHR cases have upheld surveillance regimes that did not
include prior review,350 and the need for speed in exigent national security
contexts351 surely demonstrates the undue burden that prior review would
cause.
The other more serious gap concerns U.S. bulk collection under EO
12,333.352 The FISC does not review this collection, which Congress has
consigned solely to the Executive Branch subject to a presidential
finding.353 An interagency body reviews collection under EO 12,333, but
that does not provide the independence that human rights precedents
require. The State Department ombudsperson created under the new
U.S.–EU Privacy Shield agreement354 may fall short in independence,
because that individual serves at the pleasure of the President. To fill this
gap, either Congress should empower the FISC to engage in this review,
aided by a public advocate who would push back against the Executive
Branch’s arguments,355 or the President or Congress should set up an
independent board to perform the task, with the board’s members
removable by the President only “for cause.”356 Without this
349. 50 U.S.C. § 1801a(e)(2) (2012).
350. E.g., Kennedy, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. paras. 79–80 (upholding a regime in which a cabinet
ministry issues warrants for its own investigations).
351. U.S. courts have recognized this issue in crafting a foreign intelligence exception to the
warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 341 (3rd Cir. 2011); United
States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10–CR–
00475–KI–1, 2014 WL 2866749, at *15 (D. Or. June 24, 2014); In re Directives Pursuant to
Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev.
2008); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), at 424 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)
(celebrating the Executive’s virtue of “dispatch”).
352. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 45.
354. See supra notes 299–302 and accompanying text.
355. See Lederman & Vladeck, supra note 16.
356. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483–84
(2010) (invalidating removal restrictions on members of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board within the Securities and Exchange Commission). This level of independence
might well be consistent with the ECHR case law, which has approved Germany’s reliance on the
G10; the G10 is not fully independent of politics, because it includes members of Germany’s
parliament. See Weber v. Germany, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 25. Departmental inspectors
general (IGs) can provide another kind of independent check, although IGs’ role entails
assessment of programs, not review of particular decisions. Because IGs issue reports to Congress,
they have a constituency in another branch of government that insulates them in part from
executive branch pressure. Cf. Emily Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 88 (2014) (noting the importance of IGs in assessment of FBI’s role in
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comprehensive commitment to independent scrutiny, U.S. overseas
surveillance will suffer from a significant vulnerability under human
rights norms.
b. Notice
Notice is important to review, since potentially aggrieved parties need
notice to seek recourse from an independent body. The international law
principle of legality also enshrines notice in a broader sense, requiring
that members of a polity know before the fact of actions governments
may take that adversely affect their interests.357 Moreover, in human
rights law, notice and legality require some degree of formality in the
enactment of policy. Policy should be written, not made on the fly
through furtive official conversations. Nonetheless, a state need not
provide every subject of an investigation with notice that she is under
surveillance, since such broad notice would provide suspects with a road
map of law enforcement efforts.358 Snowden’s revelations, by pushing
states toward greater transparency, have moved the dial toward
compliance with the notice prong of human rights law.
In Britain, the IPT found that Britain had violated provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights prior to the Snowden
disclosures.359 However, in the wake of Snowden’s disclosures, the IPT
concluded that Britain’s surveillance framework passed muster.360 While
recent statutory changes that broadened surveillance powers may change
domestic intelligence-gathering); Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without
Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 94–95 (2014) (suggesting that privacy
and civil liberties officers within executive departments can provide different perspective that
influences policy); DeLong, supra note 182, at 86–88 (discussing importance of internalizing
compliance within intelligence agencies dealing with large-scale data analysis).
357. This principle is clearest when the government seeks to criminalize conduct. Since
fundamental fairness requires that individuals have an opportunity to conform their conduct to
law, both the principle of legality and the U.S. Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 10, bar punishment for conduct that preceded enactment of a statutory prohibition.
As the text explains, once the state meets this requirement, it need not provide specific notice to
each individual who may be subject to surveillance for violating a duly enacted law.
358. Weber, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 135 (observing that “notification might reveal the
working methods and fields of operation of the Intelligence Service” and that “the very absence
of knowledge of surveillance . . . ensures the efficacy” of the surveillance effort); see also Paul
M. Schwartz, German and U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Law: Legal Regulation of Domestic
Law Enforcement Surveillance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751, 776 (2003) (observing that under European
law secrecy is appropriate if “interests of the State justified secrecy”); but see Sudha Setty,
Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful Accountability, 51 STAN. J. INT’L L. 69
(2015) (warning that secrecy can insulate government overreaching from effective review).
359. See Liberty & Others v. Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, [2015]
UKIPTrib 13 77-H para. 23, http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/Liberty_Ors_Judgment_6Feb15.pdf.
360. Id. at paras. 22–23.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

69

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 3

1114

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

that assessment, as a British court recently held,361 at least Britain’s new
law was the product of open debate.
In the United States, official public documents outlining
implementation of PPD-28 provide notice of machine access overseas.362
The PPD-28 documents articulate—in a fashion that is unprecedented in
its candor regarding intelligence collection—that the United States
engages in bulk collection, as well as scanning, of transnational
material.363 The U.S. documents’ discussion of “SIGINT [signals
intelligence] data that is temporarily acquired to facilitate targeted
collection”364 signals to any reasonably attentive reader that the United
States is using machines to scan international communications. The PPD28 documents also reveal the purposes served by U.S. bulk collection
abroad, such as counterterrorism, counterespionage, antiproliferation,
and transnational crime.365 With some fairly modest steps, the United
States has leapt to the head of the class on notice. More is unnecessary,
particularly given legitimate concerns about tipping off terrorists.
c. Recourse
Notice to an individual subject of inappropriate surveillance is part of
the recourse that human rights law requires for victims of government
overreaching.366 Recourse, which should entail an independent decision
maker,367 is especially important for machine access because of the risk
that mining multiple databases will compound input errors (as the saying
goes, “Garbage in, garbage out”).368 That has happened in the case of nofly lists,369 and it is a risk in other contexts as well.
The United States needs to improve its avenues for recourse.
Currently, recourse in the national security surveillance space is
exceedingly limited.370 No independent agency exists to field complaints,
and standing doctrine restricts remedies in federal courts.371 The Judicial
361. See Davis v. Home Sec’y, No. CO/3365/2014, [2015] EWHC (Admin) 2092 [para. 91]
(Royal Ct. of Justice London Div. 2015).
362. See PPD-28 Supplemental Procedures, supra note 27, at 7 n.1 (defining bulk collection).
363. Id. at 7–8.
364. Id. at 7 n.2.
365. Id. at 7–8; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B) (2012) (permitting limited collection of
foreign intelligence information related to “foreign affairs” of United States); supra notes 283–93
and accompanying text (discussing “foreign affairs” prong of Section 702).
366. See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. paras. 79–80 (2010).
367. See id. at para. 127.
368. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 5, at 76, 274–75.
369. See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1141–42 (D. Or. 2014).
370. See Margulies, supra note 8, at 2163.
371. See Clapper v. Amnesty, Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1149–50 (2013) (narrowly
construing the standing requirement for recourse in federal courts); cf. Obama v. Klayman, 800
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Redress Act enhances recourse.372 This legislation extends protections in
the U.S. Privacy Act to non-U.S. persons outside the United States who
are nationals of states that agree to share information with the United
States for law enforcement purposes and provide “appropriate privacy
protections” for such information.373 The Privacy Act furnishes a
mechanism for individuals to gain access to government data or records
about them and seek judicial remedies for denying individuals such
access or engaging in improper collection, storage, or use of such data.374
However, like the Privacy Act, the Judicial Redress Act exempts data
collected, acquired, or stored for law enforcement375 or national
security376 purposes.377 These categorical exemptions undermine the
Judicial Redress Act’s utility as an avenue for recourse. 378 While the
ombudsperson established by the new Privacy Shield agreement may aid
in promoting recourse, the CJEU has in a prior case viewed an
ombudsperson as an inadequate cure for procedural deficits.379
Recognition of this weakness can readily coexist with the
understanding that law enforcement and national security necessarily
impose some limits on recourse. Law enforcement and national security
needs will shape the contours of government agencies’ responses to
queries from individuals. In Britain, for example, the IPT provides
recourse, while ensuring that its decisions do not allow terrorists to “game
plan” attempts to elude surveillance. When the IPT rejects a complaint, it
informs the complainant with characteristic British concision that “no
determination has been made in his favour.”380 That sparse
pronouncement is sufficient under human rights law.381 A similar finding
in a U.S. tribunal would not jeopardize the U.S. intelligence apparatus.
F.3d 559, 561–62, (D.C. Cir. 2015) (vacating the preliminary injunction and remanding for further
proceedings on the ground that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on
standing to challenge government surveillance policies, since the plaintiffs had not shown a
sufficiently high probability that they had been subject to surveillance).
372. Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-126, 130 Stat. 282 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
552a note).
373. Id. § 2(d).
374. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)–(g) (2012).
375. See id. § 552a(k)(2).
376. See id. § 552(b)(1).
377. See H.R. 1428, § 2(a)(1) (incorporating by reference exemptions in the Privacy Act).
378. If the Judicial Redress Act does not provide adequate recourse, then European data
commissioners and the European Court of Justice may not approve revisions to regimes such as
“Safe Harbor,” which permitted companies on both sides of the Atlantic to share customer data
to facilitate commercial transactions.
379. See Joined Cases C-584/10, C-593/10 & C-595/10, Kadi v. European Commission
(European Court of Justice 18 July 2013) (holding that ombudsperson was not sufficient to cure
procedural flaws in regime for blocking assets of suspected terrorist financiers).
380. Kennedy v. United Kingdom, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 79 (2010).
381. See id.
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Of course, a finding for a complainant might reveal that, on occasion,
U.S. intelligence agencies make mistakes. However, freely
acknowledging missteps might actually bolster the United States’
standing around the globe. Thanks to the PPD-28 process initiated by
President Obama, transparency has reinvigorated the United States’
stance on intelligence collection overseas. Independent recourse would
be consistent with this salutary trend.
CONCLUSION
Anger was a common reaction in the United States and abroad to
Edward Snowden’s disclosures. Some indignation against government is
healthy in a democracy. However, indignation can polarize positions and
obscure nuance that makes debate productive. In analyzing machine
surveillance, this Article has endeavored to redress the balance.
Two camps have battled over the scope of state machine surveillance
abroad. The state-centric camp argues that human rights agreements such
as the ICCPR do not even apply and that machine access is inherently
unintrusive. Surveillance critics respond with the three-pronged
equivalency thesis: machine and human access are equivalent invasions
of privacy, a state’s technological capabilities drive surveillance practice,
and legal protections must be equivalent for both a state’s nationals and
non-nationals overseas. Each approach is flawed.
The state-centric camp is wrong about the applicability of human
rights agreements, which have extra-territorial effect. It is also in part
wrong about machine access, which can wreak both deontological and
consequential harm. However, the equivalency thesis also misses the
mark. While machine access can be problematic, safeguards can ease the
problem and ensure that law governs a state’s capabilities. Moreover,
international law, including Security Council resolutions combating ISIS
and Al Qaeda, permits surveillance abroad that will prevent terrorist
groups from gaining safe havens, even when that surveillance is more
intrusive than domestic surveillance efforts.
Machine searches are a powerful tool, but surveillance critics are right
that they are not a panacea. Safeguards are needed to channel their
benefits and reduce the risk of abuse abroad. Because of the need to
accommodate Security Council resolutions, LOAC, and privacy–privacy
trade-offs, along with the margin of appreciation that courts have usually
accorded states and the ICCPR’s loose arbitrariness standard, a
deferential proportionality test should govern the search for safeguards.
This standard, as applied to machine searches abroad, has three pillars:
purpose, reliability, and review.
The purpose of surveillance must be exigent, such as national security,
although human rights decisions demonstrate that states need not cite
more specific purposes that would tip off terrorists. Nevertheless, a
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national security purpose creates some clear baselines. For example,
while a state can engage in bulk collection of content in another country
involved in an armed conflict with the collecting state, bulk collection of
all of a country’s communications content is inappropriate outside the
sphere of armed conflict. In other words, the United States should permit
jet ski enthusiasts in the Bahamas to arrange their transportation without
a machine listening to the call, unless U.S. law enforcement has evidence
that the jet skis will be used for terrorism or the transport of drugs to
another country.
Each state should validate machine searches. Validation can replace
the substantive verbal explanation that the transparency paradox
precludes. In addition, validation should involve commonly accepted
metrics, such as precision and recall. Machine searches should
demonstrate their worth in finding false negatives without excessive false
positives. If machines cannot meet this standard, older methods, such as
human informants, should be used.
Review should be independent, as the CJEU stressed in Schrems. In
the United States, courts issue domestic warrants, ensure that domestic
metadata collected under the Patriot Act and queried by analysts has
reasonable and articulable links to terrorism, and review targeted
collection under FISA’s Section 702. The FISC should have a public
advocate who pushes back against government surveillance requests.
Moreover, an independent board or agency should review bulk collection
under EO 12,333. In addition, an independent agency should review
complaints from individuals who assert that the government wrongfully
collected or retained their personal information. Machines are not good
at detecting flawed inputs, and humans are sometimes too enchanted with
their own machine creations to do the follow-up required to ensure
accuracy. Recourse is a necessary backstop.
The safeguards suggested in this Article may not satisfy the statecentric camp or the champions of the equivalency thesis. For the statecentric camp, anything less than untrammeled discretion is a
disappointment. The equivalency theorists, for their part, may wish for
more onerous restrictions on machine surveillance. The model suggested
here does not opt for either of these polar positions. However, it will
impose accountability on machine surveillance abroad, while enabling
innovation and protecting the public. That combination of virtues is an
improvement over either rage or complacency.
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